

the social contract

/THē/ /'sōSHəl/ /'kän trackt/

noun. 1: An agreement among the members of an organized society

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Editor's Note

The Social Contract attempts to compile and publish timely articles that provide fresh and unique insight into contemporary political events and theories. This year, the content of the journal reflects the way in which the traditional scope of political science is evolving. While the articles in this edition focus on the usual topics of international relations, state-society relations, justice, and social and public policy, they are being considered through new and often interdisciplinary tools offered by sociology, anthropology, and gender studies. As a result, this year's articles are especially rigorous in their analysis and reflect the exciting new directions taken by the political science discipline.

In our first article, Surer Mohamed examines the impact of “the Anglosphere” on contemporary international relations. She argues that the Anglosphere shaped the “War on Terror” by dividing the world into ‘civilized’ and ‘barbaric,’ consolidating the ‘coalition of the willing,’ and created discursive ‘rogue states’ that were consolidated into the ‘axis of evil’ against which the world must fight. In line with Mohamed’s international focus, Nancy Zagabe analyzes civil conflict to suggest that the dynamics of war have important gendered dimensions that must be examined in the interest of better humanitarian assistance and diplomacy.

The next two articles explore North American social movements pertaining to gender identity and pop culture. Jaime Rimer compares two gender identity-based movements—the queer and LGBTQ movement—to argue that the former, while holding great theoretical potential to challenge normalcy, is not an effective, stand-alone rights claiming mechanism. Aramide Odutayo addresses the tensions between the feminist movement by analyzing the #solidarityisforwhitewomen movement and discussing its effectiveness as a social movement that seeks to highlight the concerns of minority women.

In analyzing pop culture through a gendered lens, Meghan Lobzun compellingly asks whether the famous David Bowie could be considered a feminist and showcases the ways in which his lyrics, performances, and interviews dismantle oppressive standards of masculinity and create more emancipatory gender identities.

Next, Talitha Cherer explores the intensifying green movement from a policy perspective. Despite the EU’s ground-breaking work in elevating ‘green’ status and promoting global environmental governance, its motivations for doing so—its competitive marketing strategy—may eventually undermine its leadership. In analyzing the EU’s green global leadership through the lens of regulatory politics, Cherer examines the limited nature of these progressive, yet restricted, policies.

Michael Filice compares and contrasts the underlying structures of two warrior cultures—the Greek Agathos and the Japanese Samurai—to draw compelling conclusions about the broader social norms of these two societies. The results-based society of the Greek Agathos and the attempt-based society of the Japanese Samurai, alongside their

varied perceptions of destitution and wealth, are shown to have distinct effects on their methods of battle preparation, development of friendships, and views on success and failure.

The final article by Benjamin Charlebois examines the military-industrial complex (MIC) of the U.S. since its inception during WWII, the expansion of which has gone wholly unchecked. Charlebois problematizes the MIC, arguing that the needs of the defence industry will continue to take precedent over those of the general public unless action is taken.

We extend special thanks to Laura Stephenson, the Undergraduate Chair of Political Science, and Nigmendra Narain, for their guidance and support. We are also grateful to all our authors for their hard work, innovative ideas, and cooperation during a surprisingly seamless editing process. Finally, we thank our editing staff for their constant support throughout the year.

Rishita Apsani

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To Order the World: The Anglosphere and the Global War on Terror

Surer Mohamed

Abstract

The Anglosphere is a racialized community of states that are bounded by a collective self-imagining—of a common language, value system and understanding of the international order. In this paper, I chart the rise of this group through history, finding that its creation served important ideological purposes during the heyday of colonialism. As a result of this racialized history, the Anglosphere has solidified a special place in the contemporary international hierarchy—it manages to police the international system, while simultaneously exempting itself from the rules that govern it. This paper examines the way in which the contemporary Anglosphere functions by exploring its role in the Global War on Terror. I conclude that the Anglosphere plays a major (if unacknowledged) role in ordering our current international system.

Introduction

It is not an accident that ‘race’ as an analytical category is largely missing in the study of International Relations. This is a function of both particular and general trends: the particularly unsavory history of IR as a study of empire,¹ as well as the general instinct to overlook ‘race’ as a function of whiteness. ‘Race’ does not easily lend itself to either the capabilities/threats logic of realism, or a liberal understanding of progress. Instead, it

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hangs unnoticeably in the ether, ordering implicit decisions about the Other and offering understandings of the Self.ⁱⁱ

This paper will attempt to reconcile with this erasure by employing a critical reading of the ‘Anglosphere’, which describes a network of ‘special relationships’ between a core of English-speaking nations.ⁱⁱⁱ It will argue that the inter-relations between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand can be seen to constitute an “international, transnational, civilizational and imperial entity within the global society,” formed gradually from a racialized history.^{iv} In doing so, this paper will locate the Anglosphere identity and its special role in global history. It will then move to explore the ways that the Anglosphere impacts world politics by considering it in the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). By examining discourses about barbarianism, the peculiar traits of the ‘coalition of the willing’, and contrasting rogue states against the Anglosphere, this paper will show the many ways that the Anglosphere shifts the global stage. I conclude that conceptions about the ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ are reified through the continued influence of the Anglosphere on ordering international relations.

Theorizing the Anglosphere

According to an aptly titled 1900 text called *Anglo-Saxons and Others*, the constitutive essence that sets the Anglo-Saxon apart is a “will, energy in action, and the habit of self-determination, combined with the sense of individual liberty, of personal independence.”

The Anglosphere served an important ideological purpose – it explained, without need of reference to exploitation and conquest, the reasons that English-speaking peoples were able to succeed in the international arena.

The author goes on to conclude that these traits have made the Anglo-Saxon people singularly “great.”^v This triumphalist argument serves both an explanatory and normalizing function, in that it explains the differing relations in the world, as well as ascribes positive characteristics to the Anglo-Saxon national character. As Srdjan Vucetic outlines, this early 20th century understanding of Anglo-Saxon unity was founded on three axes: “Protestantism, modernity, and civilization.”^{vi} This emerging “great rapprochement” between Great Britain and the United States was by no means guaranteed. As Vucetic argues, it was in fact the

result of racialized processes of Othering which tied both nations to a romantic ideal of Anglo-Saxonism—for Great Britain, this was the ‘Irish Question’; for the United States it was the ‘Indian’ and ‘Mexican’ Others over which they were slowly gaining control.^{vii} With this emerging special relationship between the Atlantic powers came relationships formed between the decolonizing British settler colonies of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, who in time all came to understand themselves through this shared Anglo-Saxon paradigm.

This shared self-understanding made certain historical events “unthinkable” (such as war between Britain and the United States) and fostered a close relationship between the declining and rising power.^{viii} More than simply a shared language, the Anglosphere

was seen to have shared values, understandings, and beliefs about the world. The Anglosphere served an important ideological purpose—it explained, without need of reference to exploitation and conquest, the reasons that English-speaking peoples were able to succeed in the international arena. In particular, it distinguished characteristics such as freedom, security, and welfare as distinctly Anglo-Saxon in nature.^{ix} Victorious narratives about the singular triumph of the Anglo-Saxon ‘race’ abound in history. This is typified by Winston Churchill’s *History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, in which he locates the Anglosphere’s success in warfare and trade to the most intangible of concepts of liberal modernity.^x

With the notable exception of certain emergent neoconservative narratives in the late 20th century, explicit acknowledgement of the Anglosphere has all but disappeared. However, this is not to be taken for granted. Discourses about the Anglosphere have been subsumed by a universalist narrative that can, theoretically, include all peoples. But the undergirding referent and the underlying assumptions of these narratives continue to lean towards the Anglosphere ideal. It is through this implicit currency that the Anglosphere continues to retain hegemony and shape the world order. Over the past two centuries, without much pomp and circumstance, the Anglosphere has continued to wield considerable power in the international system. As Srdjan Vucetic argues,

[i]ts agents—companies, empires, states, nations—colonized and industrialized large swathes of the planet and moved millions of its inhabitants, often by force. They also acted as the market and lender of the last resort, the guardian of the reserve currency, and the bulwark against various revisionists and revolutionaries.^{xi}

This serves to answer how even with a lack of formal institutionalization, the Anglosphere identity has been able to make and remake world hierarchies in the global system. To approach the Anglosphere is to embark on a quest to understand an unstated subtext, to elaborate on implicit as well as concrete realities. This is why the dialectical method features so prominently in this endeavour.

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The ways in which the Anglosphere differs from the ‘West’ is a subject of heated debate. In its ideal-type, the Anglosphere operates as an offshoot of the West, representing a condensed version of the ideals of liberal modernity and concerns of liberal imperialism often ascribed to the West. The Anglosphere, here, constitutes a sub-civilization of the West.^{xii} There are, however, differing understandings of the closeness of these two ideas, and the extent to which they overlap. As such, there are varying degrees of co-relation between the West and the Anglosphere. Indeed, late 20th century neoconservative attempts to reclaim the Anglosphere tend to emphasize the distinct character of English-speaking nations. In *The Anglosphere Challenge*, James Bennett argues that “the English-speaking world has been the path finder of all humanity,” that it “generated the first nation-state, the first liberal democratic state, the first large secular republic, the first industrialized society, and is not generating the first information economy.”^{xiii} When he posits, “we are the standard-bearers of a civilization that has

defeated much evil,” the ‘we’ that defines the Anglosphere is separate and distinct from the ‘West’.^{xiv}

How does one identify the Anglosphere? Binaries between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’ leave much to be desired, glossing over large swaths of differences between the two categories and reifying pre-existing contingent self-understandings. The Anglosphere can be seen to fall victim to some of the same challenges, but to a lesser degree. However, there are still many problems defining the concept. If it is a linguistically defined community, it

A critical reading of the Anglosphere does not essentialize its behavior to the cultural characteristics of its constitutive communities. It instead understands the Anglosphere, as well as the West, as ‘racialized’, which means that they are identities that can be seen to hold sway because they reflect structural conditions and implicitly shape the policy agenda.

seems strange that the countries with significant populations of English-speaking and English-using communities in absolute numbers (India and China) would be excluded. This points to the fact that it is not a linguistic community, but a “macro-cultural entity—a civilizational, international, transnational, post-colonial, and (post-)imperial community united by the English language.”^{xv}

The cultural argument also runs into concerns, namely constructing a static conception of ‘culture’ to which a community’s strengths and weakness can be attributed. A critical reading of the

Anglosphere does not essentialize its behavior to the cultural characteristics of its constitutive communities. It instead understands the Anglosphere, as well as the West, as ‘racialized’, which means that they are identities that can be seen to hold sway because they reflect structural conditions and implicitly shape the policy agenda. It is this core community (and no other) that is granted the leniency to “exempt themselves from the rules that have shaped war, peace, alliances, coalitions and other manifestations of international conflict and cooperation in world politics.”^{xvi}

The Anglosphere and the Global War on Terror

In establishing an understanding of the Anglosphere, this paper will now examine three ways that it shaped the Global War on Terror. First, the Anglosphere constructed a rigid binary that divided the world into the civilized and the barbaric. Second, it created and consolidated various ‘coalitions of the willing(s)’, which relied on logics of appropriateness to execute the War on Terror. Third, it created discourses of ‘rogue states’ that emerged and were consolidated into the ‘axis of evil’.

Keeping the Barbarians at the Gates

The first way that the Anglosphere impacted the Global War on Terror was discursive in nature. In one of the first speeches where President George

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W. Bush articulated the new foreign policy posture that was to become the Global War on Terror, he addressed a strange, almost infantile concern: Why do ‘they’ hate ‘us’? This concern spoke to an understanding of Anglospheric innocence in world affairs. Bush reaffirmed what the ‘American people’ were already thinking; that they had no responsibility for the events that had occurred only weeks before. In the United States Capitol on September 20th, 2001, he provided the American people with an answer. His answer was not rooted in a historical understanding of the legacies of imperialism or even in an interpretation of the terrorist’s articulated agenda. He instead argued, “they hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”^{xvii} In this same speech came one of the first iterations of post September 11th Bush Doctrine by stating, “[y]ou are either with us or you are with the terrorists.”^{xviii} By constructing this binary, the battle lines of the Global War on Terror were drawn across civilizations. This served to reify understandings of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. As President George W. Bush articulated before the United Nations: “[c]ivilization, itself, the civilization we share, is threatened.”^{xix} If the Anglosphere was seen to constitute the apex of that civilization, if it represented the very freedoms that the ‘terrorists’ hated, then it was the Anglosphere itself that was at risk.

The “typical American”^{xx} was now threatened by a darkened and externalized Other. As Jessica LeAnn Urban argues, the “American national identity is socially constructed, represented, and idealized as homogenously white, middle-class, and masculine ... as well as individualistic, modern, Western and strong.”^{xxi} This is rooted in self-understandings forged through domestic experiences of ‘race’ and racism, as well as the binding Anglo legacy that was shared with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and of course, the United Kingdom. Similar iterations of innocence and a renewed, whitened self-identity took hold across these communities, with ‘crises of multiculturalism’ particularly impacting the internal discourses of Canada and the United Kingdom.^{xxii}

This new war, waged on behalf of free and civilized peoples everywhere, was against an invisible and unidentifiable enemy that lurked ominously in the background. Discourses of citizenship became conflated with civilizational security, reinforcing the Anglo-Saxon norm as the ideal-type citizen.^{xxiii} Kim Rygiel argues that citizens became “key weapons in the war on terror,” as racialized groups such as Arabs, Muslims, refugees and others identified as non-westerners were constructed as threatening, whereas the Anglo-American was typecast as the “citizen warrior.”^{xxiv} Internal discourses of membership and rejection then shaped understandings of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ and did so in ways that reinforced the Anglosphere’s hegemony.

Coalition(s) of the Willing

If the attack on September 11th constituted a threat to all ‘civilized’ countries, then the response should be reasonably met with an international urgency to action. However, some countries considered this obligation more seriously than others. Indeed, discursive tenants of the Anglosphere informed policy discourses in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, creating a logic of appropriateness within which military response was deemed necessary. Of course, this logic effected certain states differently (consider the lack of Canadian intervention in Iraq), but it nevertheless bounded these states to act in concert.

The concerted action of the Anglosphere was aided by a progressively developing military enmeshment dating back to the Cold War. The intelligence-sharing network between America, Britain, Canada and Australia (collectively known by the acronym ABCA), known as 'Echelon' is characterized by "high levels of cooperation as well as low levels of institutionalization."^{xxv} As Vucetic argues, the opposite is true about intelligence-sharing networks in the European Union.^{xxvi} Indeed, the recent revelations by Edward Snowden have revealed that the 'Five Eyes' intelligence community, constituted by the

Indeed, the recent revelations by Edward Snowden have revealed that the 'Five Eyes' intelligence community, constituted by the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, is the most exclusive intelligence-sharing club in the world. This interoperability and standardization is reflective of an understanding of an Anglo community of practice, which discerns those states that are 'credible' sources of information.

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It was prior to the 2003 Iraq War that the concept of the Anglosphere began to gain

currency in neoconservative foreign policy circles. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq produced the Anglosphere because even as other countries were willing to send their soldiers to fight, "the Anglos bore the brunt of warfare."^{xxvii} In the early phase of the Global War on Terror, particularly from 2001-2002, there was a strong British deference to the United States for the conduct of the military response, which resulted in Operation Enduring Freedom.^{xxviii} As Stéphanie von Hlatky argues, "[a]vailable military capabilities and interoperability with the US translated into British involvement in every facet of the conflict: the bombing campaign, special operations, as well as stabilization and nation-building."^{xxix}

Similarly, Canada "felt the impacts of the 2001 terrorist attacks directly" and acted as a "committed partner to the US-led international campaign against terrorism."^{xxx} Australia articulated an ideological struggle against terrorism akin to the Cold War struggle against communism,^{xxxi} and continued to act as one of the United States' most reliable partners. New Zealand also rhetorically and practically committed to the Global War on Terror.^{xxxii} By contrast, other 'traditional' Western allies exhibited significantly more intransigence, leading then-U.S. Defence Secretary General Donald Rumsfeld to challenge what he called "Old Europe."^{xxxiii} Thus, the 'Anglosphere' is a more useful lens through which to understand the emergent coalition(s) of the willing than that of the 'West'.

The Anglosphere Versus Rogue States

States that stand apart from the 'community of nations' and are perceived to continually challenge the norms of the international system are known as 'rogue states'. This made them, in the eyes of certain policymakers, a threat to international peace and security. During the Global War on Terror, these states' noncompliance to the rules of the international system earned them the moniker "axis of evil" from the Bush administration.

In particular, they were securitized as possible avenues for international terrorist organizations to gain nuclear, biological, or chemical proliferation. In addition to Iraq, the three countries that received the most attention under the Bush administration's counter-proliferation agenda were North Korea, Iran and Libya.^{xxxiv} "Rogue states," Bush argued, "are clearly the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists ... Those nations that violate this principle will be regarded as hostile regimes."^{xxxv} In 2004, at a speech to the National Defense University, Bush further outlined this response: "[t]hese terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide and transport America, and the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come."^{xxxvi}

The use of civilizational rhetoric here is rather significant. Rogue states (and their obsession with WMDs) represent a necessary association that raises the stakes of international terrorism from civilizational to Civilizational. It is through the rogue state that we are introduced to the logic of pre-emption, which Robert Knox argues is almost a direct reproduction of the colonial international law of the nineteenth century.^{xxxvii} Indeed, the distinction between civilized states (which were full members of the 'Family of Nations') and uncivilized states (which existed as objects to be acted upon) is reproduced through understandings of the Anglosphere (worthy of high levels of interoperability) and the rogue state (the international pariah doomed to destroy the world).^{xxxviii} Understandings of international states are racialized, reified, and certainly historically contingent.

The distinction between civilized states (which were full members of the 'Family of Nations') and uncivilized states (which existed as objects to be acted upon) is reproduced through understandings of the Anglosphere (worthy of high levels of interoperability) and the rogue state (the international pariah doomed to destroy the world).

Conclusion

This paper has explored the Anglosphere as a lens through which to understand issues in global security. It theorized the Anglosphere by locating it in its imperial history and present. It then explored the impact of the Anglosphere on the Global War on Terror by examining citizenship discourses, the coalition of the willing, and rogue states. The implications of the Anglosphere are vast, as the concept implicitly structures the international sphere and domestic discourses of belonging. Interpretations of the international system from the perspective of race are long overdue, and very welcome. The West, the Anglosphere, and other racialized identities need to be situated in their historical contexts in order to expose the histories of the universalistic missions that they now espouse.

Endnotes

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- ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid., 2.
- ^{iv} Ibid., 2.
- ^v Aline Gorren, *Anglo-Saxons & Others* (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1900), 107.
- ^{vi} Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, 25.
- ^{vii} Ibid., 30.
- ^{viii} Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, 23.
- ^{ix} Ibid., 2.
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- ^{xiii} James C. Bennett, *The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford; Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 67.
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- ^{xv} Srdjan Vucetic, "The Logics of Culture in the Anglosphere," in *Culture and External Relations: Europe and Beyond*, ed. Jozef Batora et al. (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 49.
- ^{xvi} Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, 3.
- ^{xvii} George W. Bush and John W. Dietrich, *The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches and Commentary* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005): 52.
- ^{xviii} Ibid., 53.
- ^{xix} Ibid., 26.
- ^{xx} Here you can substitute Canadian, Kiwi, Briton or Australian.
- ^{xxi} Jessica Leann Urban, "Bordering on the Absurd: National, Civilizational, and Environmental Security Discourse on Immigration," in *A New Kind of Containment: "The War on Terror," Race, and Sexuality*, ed. Carmen R. Lugo-Lugo et al. (New York: Rodopi, 2009), 120.
- ^{xxii} Browning, "Beyond the West and towards the Anglosphere?" 163.
- ^{xxiii} Kim Rygiel, "Protecting and Proving Identity: The Biopolitics of Waging War through Citizenship in the Post-9/11 era," in *(En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics*, ed. Krista Hunt et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 163.
- ^{xxiv} Ibid., 147.
- ^{xxv} Vucetic, "The Logics of Culture in the Anglosphere," 58.
- ^{xxvi} Ibid.
- ^{xxvii} Vucetic, *The Anglosphere*, 126.
- ^{xxviii} Stéfanie von Hlatky, *American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 60.
- ^{xxix} Stéfanie von Hlatky, *American Allies*, 60.
- ^{xxx} Ibid., 98.
- ^{xxxi} Ibid., 124.
- ^{xxxii} Ibid., 130.
- ^{xxxiii} Vucetic, "The Logics of Culture in the Anglosphere," 59.
- ^{xxxiv} George W. Bush, *The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader*, 120.

xxxv Ibid., 127.

xxxvi Ibid., 236

xxxvii Robert Knox, "Civilizing Interventions? Race, War and International Law," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2013): 114.

xxxviii Ibid.

Gendered Conflict Beyond Women: A Comprehensive Analysis of Gendered Dynamics of Sexual Violence

Nancy Zagabe

Abstract

Sexual violence in armed conflict has long been tolerated as an inevitable feature of war. Scholarship on sexual violence in war has tended to focus on positioning heterosexual women as victims, rather than seeking to question how conflict itself is an inherently gendered dynamic. Recent feminist scholarship has explored the latter dynamic in more detail. This paper draws upon this tradition to elaborate on the following: first, the assumption that women are the sole victims of sexual violence and the negative consequences of this thinking; second, the perplexity and dynamics of masculinity with regards to perpetrators will be analyzed; finally, with regards to international institutions, that language used in this discourse is of the utmost importance in its understanding. This paper will ultimately argue that the gendered dynamics of sexual violence dictate the roles of victims, perpetrators, and institutions.

Introduction

Extreme levels of violence and cruelty targeting civilian populations often characterize contemporary armed conflicts. The pervasive presence of sexual violence, specifically in armed conflict has hence become a central issue in academia. In addition, sexual violence has become a topic of increasing importance in discussions and applications of international security. Prior to the twentieth century, sexual violence in armed conflict had

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long been tolerated as one of conflicts inevitable consequences. While several frameworks address the issue of sexual violence in armed conflict, the social constructivist framework, which holds that violence occurs to gendered bodies differently as a result of accepted ideas held about those bodies, is most useful in exploring the effect of gender on conflict.ⁱ Using this overarching framework, this paper will emphasize the role of perceptions and constructions of femininity and masculinity to assert that gendered dynamics of sexual violence dictate the roles of victims, perpetrators and international actors. By extension, this essay will demonstrate the ways in which these dynamics result in insecurity for some but security for others. In doing so, this essay will seek to assess the threat that sexual violence poses on both individuals and the international community as a whole.

In the investigation of the gendered dynamics of sexual violence, this paper will be guided by one main framework of security as outlined by Laura J. Shepherd in Chapter 8 of Peter Burgess' book, which examines frameworks within the context of gender and security. As previously mentioned, Shepherd makes the important distinction that gender plays a role in determining the means of violence undertaken against certain individuals.ⁱⁱ This essay will predominately concern itself with upholding and furthering Shepherd's principle, which holds that gendered constructions are integral in determining the role of victims, perpetrators and international actors. Furthermore, this paper will also examine how these complex dynamics result in further insecurity amongst vulnerable bodies.

Prior to examining the issue of gendered dynamics in sexual violence, it is worthwhile to consider conventional definitions of these terms. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines gender as socially constructed roles or behaviors that a given society considers appropriate for men and women.ⁱⁱⁱ This definition thus upholds the notion that gender is not rigid or unchanging but rather that gender is fluid and, by consequence, is an inherently complex concept. The WHO defines sexual violence as the any sexual act or attempt against an individual's sexuality using coercion.^{iv} By contrast, Liz Kelly provides a very different definition. Kelly holds that sexual violence comprises of acts of male violence against female victims.^v While this paper is sensitive to the fact that women are disproportionately affected by sexual violence, this definition is limited in that it is not as fully encompassing as the definition of the WHO. Therefore, in reference to both gender and sexual violence, the definitions as prescribed by the WHO will provide a more comprehensive view to these issues.

Victims

In regards to sexual violence, contemporary conflicts such as the genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda have predominantly depicted women as victims, and by consequence women have been at the forefront of this narrative. While the issue of women as a marginalized group in of itself is a highly-charged topic, this paper predominately concerns itself with examining how socially constructed views of women result in women being disproportionately targeted as victims of sexual violence. The idea of feminized victimization is especially pervasive in atrocious acts of genocide. More specifically, the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina effectively depicts the notion of gendered sexual violence in practice. Vulnerability and fragility are features predominantly associated with femininity.

Consequently, women in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict were perceived as the most vulnerable members of the Muslim community and were thus targeted of sexual violence.^{vi} The strategic choice to undermine a community through the explicit targeting those whom are perceived to be its most vulnerable members is indicative of gendered constructs of sexual violence. By extension, these widely accepted perceptions result in women becoming especially insecure bodies.

Tradition, femininity and fertility have often been used synonymously. In the mutiny in Bosnia-Herzegovina, women's fertility and reproductive functions became a potent tool of ethnic cleansing. Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim women were kept in enclosed camps and systematically raped for extended periods of time.^{vii} Moreover, Serbian forces calculated these vicious rapes as a lethal two pronged means of producing an ethnically homogenous state and destroying the Muslim community. If the rapes resulted in impregnation, victims brought life to a new generation of ethnic Bosnian-Serbian children and death to their own community.^{viii} Both literally and figuratively, women are central figures in birthing a nation's future generation and were therefore potent targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, these gendered constructions became a calculated tool in the ethnic cleansing campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, by consequence of this tactic, women became increasingly insecure in that their reproductive functions were complicit in the goals of the Serbian forces.

Similar to the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina, female victims of the insurgency in Rwanda were targeted with the premeditated intention of destroying their reproductive capabilities, and thus stripping them of a key feature of their femininity. While the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign primarily sought to impregnate the women, the Rwandan genocide sought to destroy women's ability to reproduce Tutsi children.^{ix} Moreover, the *Genocidaires* believed that through rape, the victims would be further ostracized from their communities as female rape victims would no longer be suitable partners for men.^x In these incidents, the rapes of Tutsi women were thought of as mechanisms to which would effectively bring shame and humiliation to them.^{xi} The use of sexual violence in both the mass killings in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda can thus be understood as an attack at gender-constructed perceptions. The perpetrators perceived women to be associated with traits such as fertility and vulnerability. By extension, these gendered perceptions largely dictated the means by which these victims were violated.

Male Victims

By in large, the narrative, which seeks to shed light on the victims of sexual violence, has been dominated by the portrayal of women as the sole victims of this type violence. This is evident in Liz Kelly's definition of sexual violence, which holds that while males occupy the roles of evil, antagonistic perpetrators, women have the tendency to be vulnerable, helpless victims. As a result of deeply rooted perceptions congruent to that of Kelly's, male victims of sexual violence have often been invisible. In addition, because males are often perpetrators of sexual violence, stigma impedes recognition of heterosexual males as victims.^{xiii} By referencing the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the suffering of male victims of sexual violence are brought to light. In both genocides, genital mutilation

became the primary means of stripping males of their masculinity.^{xiii} In relations to security studies, this dismissal of males as unlikely victims of exceptionally gruesome sexual violence results in invisible victims and is therefore theoretically and practically problematic. Furthering this, the conception of males as perpetrators and not victims, reinforces a dangerous cycle of insecurity whereby males are ashamed to come forward as victims due to masculine ideas. By consequence, this makes these males even more susceptible to further victimization.

While it is a widely accepted view to hold femininity as associated with vulnerability and weakness, by contrast masculinity is often synonymous with power and strength. This gendered perception of masculinity is thus an especially potent notion in regards to male victims. In an effort to undermine the enemy, perpetrators often seek to strip male victims of their masculinity, and by extension their power. Moreover, it is this principle of victim feminization of male victims that guides the practices of sexual violence against males.^{xiv} As previously mentioned, in the ethnic cleansing campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian males were subjected to genital mutilation, in an effort to further prevent the birth of Muslim-Bosnian children. In addition, this particular form of sexual violence was undertaken with the specific intent of transforming these males into feminized, and therefore inherently vulnerable and weak, bodies. The examination of both males as well as females as victims of sexual violence thus reinforces the idea that sexual violence happens to gendered bodies differently according to socially constructed perceptions of masculinity and femininity. In sum, the malleable nature of gender constructs is omnipresent in the roles of victims in sexual violence.

Perpetrators

While victims are central to the study of gender and sexual violence, in order to comprehensively examine the intricate dynamics of sexual violence one must not dismiss the role of those complicit in these heinous crimes. Perceptions of masculinity in sexual violence are especially fundamental in the role of perpetrators of sexual violence. Culprits are most often associated with traits of masculinity such as aggression and the need to reinforce their dominance over passive female victims. Central to the universal dichotomization of masculine aggressors against the vulnerable feminine victim is that of an overarching patriarchal structure.^{xv} With regards to sexual violence in armed conflict, this patriarchal structure thus further polarizes those masculine bodies that reinforce the patriarchy and those feminized bodies that are subject to the rules of the patriarchy.^{xvi} Furthering this, in the conceptual study of security, patriarchies result in hegemonic male domination, therein causing insecurity for women.

Admittedly, the emphasis on patriarchal societies in relation to perpetrators of sexual violence is not unfounded. However, it is also helpful to the study of the gendered dynamics of sexual violence to examine the concept of militarized masculinity. In short, militarized masculinity promotes hyper masculinized behaviour such as the assertion of dominance over the perceived subservient others.^{xvii} While this notion has been highly contested, the militarized masculinity rhetoric reinforces the notion that brutalized sexual acts such as gang rapes further increases bonding amongst members.^{xviii} By in large, sexual

violence is thus normalized through this hyper masculine discourse. In addition, these acts reinforce the significant power relations in sexual violence. Through violating subordinate bodies, these vicious acts of sexual violence effectively become transformed into masculine power.^{xix} In sum, the concept of militarized masculinity effectively grants a license for further subversions of sexual violence by being understood and promoted as a regular occurrence.

The agents of victims and perpetrators effectively demonstrate the gendered dynamics of sexual violence. Perceptions of masculinity are fundamental to the concept of invisible male victims as well as militarized masculinity. By contrast, femininity is equated with traits such as fertility and vulnerability. It is thus evident that the negotiated interpretations of what it means to be feminine or masculine dictate the means by which sexual violence is used.

International Institutions

Until recently, the primary focus in regards to sexual violence has been examining the gendered dynamics between agents. Admittedly, while the relationships between victims and perpetrators are fundamental to the understanding of gendered constructions of sexual violence, emergence of the examination of the institutions has made fruitful contributions to this field of study. An increased concern regarding international institutions in sexual violence narratives coincide with the landmark decisions during the International Criminal Tribunals for both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Despite unprecedented criminal indictments of perpetrators of sexual violence, language used by international institutions is fundamentally problematic. Moreover, this language further reinforces and institutionalizes gendered dichotomies.^{xx} International institutions like the United Nations are central securitizing bodies. By extension, the language used by these international institutions regarding sexual violence dictates the ways in which individuals are securitized. Furthermore, the political impact of the gendered discourses in policy making results in security for some bodies, and insecurity for others.

The universal dichotomization of women as vulnerable bodies is especially pervasive in international institutions. In the past, terms such as sexual violence, gender based violence and violence against women were used interchangeably by institutions like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Population Fund.^{xxi} While the United Nations amongst other institutions has moved away from doing so, using loaded terms interchangeably is fundamentally problematic for several reasons. Most notably, these problematic narratives govern the ways in which sexual violence is securitized through legal provisions.^{xxii} Article 27 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War effectively depicts this fundamentally gender-biased narrative. The convention calls specifically for women to be protected especially from acts of sexual violence such as rape and forced prostitution (ICRC). Legal provisions of this nature focus exclusively on the experiences of heterosexual women and thus highlight the need for more inclusive language. By extension, while one marginalized body is securitized and thus benefits from these provisions, other bodies, for example, male victims of sexual violence are left unprotected by international humanitarian law. It is thus evident

that the language used by international institutions furthers the nexus of women as sole victims of sexual violence, rather than addressing why gender has remained an enduring issue in armed conflicts.

In addition, international humanitarian law has indirectly worked to further institutionalize the perception of women as vulnerable bodies in need of protection. This narrative is often characterized by the notion of white males, saving or protecting brown women, from brown men.^{xxiii} This saving discourse is congruent to that of Tom Moylan, who speaks extensively of the myth of protection, in relation to gender in armed conflict. In short, Moylan argued that this myth of protection effectively convinces women that they must be protected from the scourges of armed conflict.^{xxiv} By consequence, sexual violence is thus understood as an issue, which affects women due to their perceived associations of femininity and vulnerability. Furthermore, this notion holds women as nothing more than victims of horrible crimes, rather than agents capable of contributing to conflict resolution.

By contrast to the discourse of women as vulnerable bodies, this myth of protection depicts international institutions as hyper masculinized heroic saviors of these defenceless women. The myth assumes that agents of international institutions are solely capable of providing security for these vulnerable bodies. Notably, several harsh criticisms arose following United Nations' Goodwill Ambassador Emma Watson's speech. While well intentioned, elements of Watson's speech effectively depict this myth of protection. The United Nation's campaign effectively titled He for She calls for action from males to stand up against violations of women's rights.^{xxv} By extension, as many critics have argued, the campaign effectively calls for men to fulfill this role of heroic savior of women.^{xxvi} While criticisms of Emma Watson's unprecedented viral campaign are plentiful, the speech highlights the need for more comprehensive action amongst all actors.

The dark legacy of the mass rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina has brought gendered security to the international political agenda to an unprecedented extent. Until recently, the highly debated issues of sexual violence and gender have been characterized by addressing the prejudices suffering by heterosexual females. However, legislation progressively has moved away from the saving discourse and has shifted towards the employment of inclusive conflict management techniques. Most notably, in 2002, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1325.^{xxvii} This resolution emphasizes the role of women in conflict management and prevention.^{xxviii} This landmark resolution is especially significant to the study of gendered dynamics of sexual violence in that it acknowledges women as powerful contributors to conflict resolution rather than defenceless victims. Moreover, progress of this sort is exemplarily in the attempts of the United Nations to comprehensively address the issue of gendered dynamic of violence.

UNSC 1325 and UNSC 1820

While United Nations Security Council's resolution 1325 proved to be a step in the right direction in terms of inclusive language and empowerment of marginalized groups, United Nations Security Council resolution 1820 unfortunately reverts back to the problematic language that UNSC 1325 sought to annul. Adopted eight years after the initial implementation of resolution 1325, resolution 1820 specifically addresses acts of sexual

violence against civilians within the framework of armed conflict.^{xxix} UNSC resolution 1820 is seemingly a reaffirmation of the sentiments expressed by resolution 1325. Amongst several similarities, UNSC resolution 1820 echoes the notion that women play an instrumental role in conflict resolution and prevention.^{xxx} A key feature of this resolution is its emphasis of ending impunity through holding perpetrators and states alike accountable for acts of sexual violence.^{xxxi} In addition, resolution 1820 holds that rape amongst other forms of sexual violence are constitutive of a crime against humanity, thus making those complicit in such acts accountable to international law.^{xxxii} Despite these progressive provisions, resolution 1820 seemingly takes one step forward and two steps back. UNSC 1820 falters in that it once again depicts women as victims.^{xxxiii} Furthermore, UNSC 1820 explicitly calls for the protection of women in particular, thereby further institutionalizing the notion of women as victims unable to protect themselves. Scholars have long scrutinized this non-inclusive language as reinforcing the myth of protection. It is therefore evident that while solution 1325 made several positive strides, UNSC 1820 regressed in inclusion of problematic discourses, which emphasize women's victimhood and the inherent need for international institutions to act as protector.

Agents, Instruments and Institutions

The sexual violence narrative is perforated with innately complex relationships between perpetrators, victims and international institutions. Particularly, this intricate web of relationships can be simply understood within the framework of agents, instruments and institutions. Agents in sexual violence are subjected to socially constructed perceptions of masculinity and femininity. By extension, the instruments used by the agents are also a reflection of these perceived conceptions of what it means to be male or female. As securitizing bodies, international institutions have a responsibility to the agents in sexual violence to implement functional and inclusive legislation. However, international legislative discourses have worked to further the nexus of women as passive victims in need of saving. Moreover, gendered notions of masculinity and femininity dictate these problematic discourses. Further considerations must be taken international law makers in order to provide security for vulnerable bodies.

Conclusion

In sum, this essay sought to demonstrate the gendered dynamic relationships between victims, perpetrators and international institutions. This essay first examined the both masculine and feminine perceptions of both and male female victims. It then demonstrated the complexities of sexual violence regarding gendered constructions of perpetrators. Finally, this paper examined how international institutions by in large reinforce problematic discourses in legislation. Furthermore, this paper sought to expand on these notions by examining the ways in which gendered dynamics create insecurity and security amongst actors. By extension of these arguments, this paper upheld and furthered Laura Shepherd's argument as presented in the Burgess text that gendered perceptions dictate the means by which sexual violence is carried out. In challenging traditional discourses, this paper sought to shed light on the dangers of essentialist dichotomous language and

perceptions. This paper conclusively holds that gender, sexual violence and security are inextricably linked. By consequence, dismissal of this notion is detrimental to the understanding of insecurity and security of gendered bodies.

Endnotes

- ⁱ Laura Shepard, "Gendering Security," in *Handbook of New Security Studies*, edited by J. Peter Burgess (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 133.
- ⁱⁱ *Ibid.*, 135.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Gender: definitions, *World Health Organization*.
- ^{iv} "World Report on Violence and Health," (World Health Organization. 2002), 149.
- ^v Shepard, "Gendering Security," 131.
- ^{vi} Debra B Bergoffen, *Contesting the Politics of Genocidal Rape: Affirming the Dignity of The Vulnerable Body*, (New York: Routledge. 2012), 12.
- ^{vii} *Ibid.*, 43.
- ^{viii} *Ibid.*
- ^{ix} Anna Llewellyn Barstow, *Wars Dirty Secret: Rape, Prostitution, and Other Crimes Against Women*, (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press. 2000), 238.
- ^x *Ibid.*
- ^{xi} Bergoffen, "Contesting the Politics," 41.
- ^{xii} Natalia Linos, "Rethinking gender-based violence during war: Is violence against Civilian men a problem worth addressing?" *Social Science and Medicine* 68 (2009): 1550.
- ^{xiii} Barstow, "War's Dirty Secret," 245.
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- ^{xvii} Beth Main Ahlberg,, Blomqvist, Olson, Pia, and Trenholm, Jill, "Constructing Soldiers From Boys in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo," *Sage Publications* (2013): 205.
- ^{xviii} Bergoffen, "Contesting the Politics," 43.
- ^{xix} Estelle B. Freedman, *Redefining Rape: Sexual Violence in the Era of Suffrage and Segregation*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2013), 14.
- ^{xx} Barstow, "War's Dirty Secret," 222.
- ^{xxi} Linos, "Rethinking gender-based violence," 1549.
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- ^{xxiii} Gayatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, (Illinois, University of Illinois Press, 1988), 308.
- ^{xxiv} Tom Moyan, "Gender Security as a Category of International Politics," *e-IR.info*, 2013.
- ^{xxv} Neha Chandrarchud, "We Should be Critical, but Not Dismissive of Emma Watson's UN Campaign," *Huffington Post*, 2014.
- ^{xxvi} *Ibid.*
- ^{xxvii} Amy Barrow, "UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820: constructing gender in Armed conflict and international humanitarian law," *International Review of the Red Cross* 92, no. 7 (2010): 229.
- ^{xxviii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xxix} *Ibid.*, 232.
- ^{xxx} United Nations Security Council, Security Council resolution 1820. "On acts of sexual Violence against civilians in armed conflicts" (2008). Web.
- ^{xxxi} *Ibid.*
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- ^{xxxiii} *Ibid.*, 223.

Queer Space Production: Is Reshaping Identity Politics a Social Movement?

Jaime Rimer

Abstract

In the 1990s, queer thought emerged as an alternative to more conservative identity politic discourses. While the greater public tends to use the terms LGBT and queer interchangeably, this is ultimately misguided. While individuals *within* LGBT circles may identify as queer, queer thought does not necessarily resonate with the greater LGBT community. While many members of the LGBT community undoubtedly embrace 'queering' identities, others accuse queer thought of undermining their substantive political gains insofar. This paper appraises these two distinct movements and argues that queer thought is not an effective, stand-alone rights claiming mechanism. However, queer academia should not be dismissed as 'theoretical nonsense'; on the contrary, queering identity holds great theoretical potential in challenging current societal identity constraints and constructs of normalcy.

Introduction

This paper will explore the production of queer space within current LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer) rights claiming frameworks. There is no cohesive framework under which to analyze the 'queer movement,' as acknowledging existing societal frameworks undermines the intentions of individuals opting to identify as queer. Queer thought is full of anomalies: it is marginalized and ridiculed among disenfranchised gay, lesbian, and feminist groups,

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but individuals *within* these groups may choose to identify as queer. Additionally, while queer thought challenges traditional identity-based social movements, its innovation may ironically increase the effectiveness of these movements. This paper concludes that while a

The queer community's ambiguous approach to identity results in their "double rejection" by both gay and lesbian communities as well as hetero-normative society, which utilize conservative, mainstream avenues to obtain rights recognition.

critical stream of thought, 'queering' one's identity does not single-handedly constitute a social movement. As queer thought actively rejects existing social classification schemes, queer theory does not, nor does it desire to, align with conventional understandings of social movements.

Identifying as Queer

Queer thought gained prominence in the 1990s within certain lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgenderedⁱ movements, but is not a synonym for the LGBT community.ⁱⁱ As queer academia rejects any one quantifiable definition of gender identity in favour of fluid thinking and temporal discontinuity, it is impossible to define 'queer' unequivocally. Heather Love uses an architectural analogy to frame queer theory as subverting "spatial relationships with the intent of destabilizing a paradigm in which heterosexuality is considered the norm."ⁱⁱⁱ Therefore, queer theory attempts to 'explode' binaries constituting normal and abnormal, homosexual and heterosexual, and male vs. female. Queer is an extremely broad category, encompassing a host of gay, lesbian, transgendered, and certain feminist advocates who reject the confines of their current 'political groupings.' As queer advocates explicitly reject mobilization strategies aligning with the 'politics of inclusion,'^{iv} anyone can choose to identify as queer, but queer does not necessarily identify with everyone.

Due to the wide range of 'queering' behaviors, there is no exhaustive list as to who belongs to the 'queer community' and/or opts to identify as queer. As Riki Wilchins notes, many individuals may identify as queer, such as intersexuals, pre and post-operative transsexuals, butch lesbians, fairies, cross-dressers, drag queens, and essentially anyone rejecting strict constructs of gender and sexuality.^v Does an extremely diverse group challenging the strict regulation of gender identity belong under the umbrella term 'queer'? Can an 'all-inclusive' strategy of self-identification effectively induce social change? While individuals identifying as queer work toward a common goal, they reject conventional political tactics which emphasize a stable, fixed identity as a prerequisite to achieving collective action.^{vi} The queer community's ambiguous approach to identity results in their "double rejection" by both gay and lesbian communities as well as hetero-normative society, which utilize conservative, mainstream avenues to obtain rights recognition.^{vii}

The Politics of Inclusion

While many gays and lesbians proudly identify as genderqueer, others fear that identifying as queer may stunt and/or reverse their legal, social, and political gains insofar. Many 'conservative' gay, lesbian, and feminist movements yearn for equality, and therefore mobilize for an extension of the employment opportunities, marital and welfare benefits

available to mainstream society.^{viii} These movements emphasize their similarities to, while downplaying their differences from, the dominant society. For example, many gay and lesbian movements utilize slogans such as “we are just like straights, but we sleep with the same sex.”^{ix} Shannon Minter explores how White, middle-class, gay men have historically blamed “anti-gay hostility” on the failure of fairies, or ‘hyper-feminized’ gay men, to assume

Gay and lesbian culture consolidated its legitimacy by excluding individuals displaying ‘inappropriate’ behavior, such as bisexual practices or any form of ‘exaggerated’ gender expression.

otherwise ‘masculine’ identity roles.^x In alignment with the ‘politics of inclusion,’ many gay and lesbian movements have created ‘gender-normative’ identities (notwithstanding their sexual orientation).

Thomas Piontek maintains that any form of identity politics requires differentiation to be successful, as the assertion of one’s identity depends on the exclusion of those who are ‘different’.^{xi} Consolidating gay and lesbian identities requires ‘policing’ individuals identifying as gay or lesbian, to ensure that group members do not hinder the movement’s image and/or objectives.^{xii} Therefore, gay and lesbian culture consolidated its legitimacy by excluding individuals displaying ‘inappropriate’ behavior, such as bisexual practices or any form of ‘exaggerated’ gender expression.^{xiii} Although many transgendered individuals consider the gay community “to be their only viable social and political home,”^{xiv} many gays and lesbians do not openly embrace transgendered presence.

Interestingly, mainstream society’s antagonism toward gay and lesbian individuals is a result of the gender role transcendence which same-sex preference represents.^{xv} Dissociating transgender issues from gay and lesbian issues is therefore a product of gay and lesbian discursive activism, and is not necessarily representative of any concrete difference between these communities. Despite the formal addition of ‘BTQ’ in the LGBTQ movement, many academics explore how the ‘B’s, T’s, and Q’s’ still face discrimination within the LGBTQ community.^{xvi} Dean Spade argues that formally, trans-activism has made some gains over the years.^{xvii} He notes that many conservative organizations previously consumed with distinguishing sexual orientation from gender identity now include “trans-inclusive” language in intake forms, surveys, mission statements, and organizational names.^{xviii} Nevertheless, focusing on the formal inclusion of transgendered and other ‘queering’ individuals ignores the more covert form of discrimination, such as the lack of transgender leadership roles,^{xix} within ‘trans-friendly’ gay and lesbian groups.

As transgendered individuals physically diverge from dichotomized, ‘male’ and ‘female’ notions of gender, it follows that they are a significant driving force in queer thought.^{xx} Spade notes, however, that even within transgender communities there is strong disagreement as to who constitutes a beneficial ‘trans-ally’ and other “movement vision” issues.^{xxi} For instance, there is a sharp divide in the literature as to whether transgendered individuals should embrace or reject the medical model of transgenderism. Some individuals embrace the medical model, as it allows for disability-based claims of discrimination, and is therefore an effective form of mobilization before the courts.^{xxii} Other

transgender advocates, however, take issue with depicting transgenderism as a mental disorder characterized by gender dysphoria.^{xxiii} By framing transgenderism as a psychological disorder, the one acceptable solution to ‘curing transgenderism’ is sex reassignment surgery (SRS),^{xxiv} which conveys that one’s gender identity must be ‘synchronized’ with his/her biological sex.

While many transsexuals opt to undergo SRS, others prefer not to get the surgery for reasons relating to cost, medical beliefs, and/or personal preference.^{xxv} Nonetheless, most government institutions utilize ‘SRS’ as the benchmark for recognizing a transgendered individual as his/her desired sex; this is arguably an assimilationist policy, as it attempts to aid the transition of transsexual individuals into mainstream society.^{xxvi} The medical model of transgenderism is a point of contention among queer scholars, who claim that transgendered individuals, cross-dressers, and other “gender benders”^{xxvii} are pressured to assimilate by making their chosen gender identity permanent. Consequently, many transgendered individuals embrace queer theory as a means to resist “sexist and heterosexist” policies attempting to ‘normalize’ genderqueer identities.^{xxviii}

Feminist Responses to Queer

While ‘queering’ feminism would presumably help deconstruct socially embedded gender roles, the “queering woman threatens the very category on which feminism depends,” and is therefore not openly embraced by many feminists.^{xxix} Feminists often define woman by her opposition to man, by what she does and does not have, such as reproductive organs.^{xxx} Nonetheless, certain strains of feminist thought, such as Jack Halberstam’s *Gaga Feminism*, embrace queer theory as a means of questioning historically oppressive conceptions of femininity. A cornerstone of *Gaga Feminism* is that we need to wait for “new social forms to give our gaga babbling meaning.”^{xxxxi} Gaga feminism, which incorporates a “form of political expression that masquerades as naïve nonsense,”^{xxxii} attempts to embrace the child talk of “gaga,” prior to it ‘evolving’ into real, dictionary-defined words. Halberstam embraces child-like sensibilities, and claims that similarly to children who have yet to undergo gender socialization, adults should be open to embracing ‘queerness.’^{xxxiii}

While biological females have created safe, women-only spaces in response to patriarchal oppression, male-to-female (MTF) transsexuals are often denied access to such spaces. In *Kimberley Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society* (2004) (BCHRT), Kimberley Nixon, a post-operative MTF transsexual, was prohibited from volunteering at a rape crisis centre despite her self-identified gender, lived experience as a woman and corresponding birth certificate.^{xxxiv} Although Nixon is not biologically female, the use of SRS (as a prerequisite to legally identify as one’s target sex) would presumably allow Nixon to win her case. Nonetheless, while the British Columbia (BC) Human Rights Tribunal ruled in favor of Nixon, its decision was overturned by the Supreme Court of BC, and her leave of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) was denied.^{xxxv}

Notably, *Vancouver Rape Relief* published a response on their website stating that although the organization acknowledges and sympathizes with the plight of transgendered individuals, as they “strongly support equality and human rights for everyone facing discrimination,” there is no room for transsexual individuals in women-only spaces.^{xxxvi} In

its public statement, the women's shelter noted that transsexuals should not try to "bend" the current law to define themselves as women; rather, transgendered individuals should press for a law which protects transgendered individuals.^{xxxvii} *Rape Relief* argues that as Nixon does not possess the shared, 'universal,' female experience, as "she has never had to contend with menstruation [or] the fear of pregnancy,"^{xxxviii} she is subsequently not a woman. *Rape Relief's* response arguably fails to acknowledge the socially constructed nature of 'maleness' and 'femaleness.'

Many feminists advocate for a shared female consciousness, and accuse queer thought's 'theoretical nonsense' of undermining the collective feminist experience.

The central premise of *Rape Relief's* argument is that Nixon's subjective identification as a woman is insufficient, as biology and lived experience must be continuous from birth.^{xxxix} This argument would be rejected by the likes of Judith Butler, who claims that gender is a performance which "constitutes the appearance of its own interior fixivity."^{xl} In other words, becoming a gender is a "naturalization" process, not a fixed biological characteristic, which entails permanent gender role-playing.^{xli} Nevertheless, mainstream, liberal feminism rejects gender variance, theories of gender performativity, and other gender identity accounts diverging from the 'universal,' and often 'White,' feminist experience.^{xlii} Accordingly, many feminists advocate for a shared female consciousness, and accuse queer thought's 'theoretical nonsense' of undermining the collective feminist experience.^{xliii}

Is Queering a Social Movement?

In light of the above, is the process of 'queering identity' a social movement? D. Stanley Eitzen and Kenneth Stewart define a social movement as "collective action to promote, resist, or reverse change."^{xliv} As Eitzen and Stewart elaborate, individuals seeking to alter existing social structures in "some meaningful way" cannot generally accomplish such goals by themselves.^{xlv} Accordingly, collective action is the optimal means to advance a political agenda and achieve social change.^{xlvi} Eitzen and Stewart list four stages by which social movements progress: members are attracted to a movement due to some 'outstanding' societal grievance, followed by a 'triggering,' high profile event bringing the grievance into 'focus.' The third phase involves moving toward political mobilization, which requires implementing formal organizational structures and resource allocation.^{xlvii} The fourth and last stage of a social movement is its successful integration into society, which Eitzen and Stewart identify as the objective of all social movements.^{xlviii}

Under the first criterion of Eitzen and Stewart's definition, queer thought could potentially qualify as a social movement. Queer thought has a substantial following, and has attracted members from a wide array of identity-based movements. While the queer community does not mobilize using assimilationist tactics, 'queering' individuals nonetheless "demand change and question the current status quo."^{xlix} Although the *Nixon* case somewhat advanced the issue of gender identity-based discrimination, it does not appear to meet the second criterion of Eitzen and Stewart's definition of a social movement. While the *Nixon* case attracted significant attention within academic circles, it

did not gain sufficient traction within mainstream media or the broader public. Had the SCC heard Nixon's appeal, the case may have received greater attention within both the media and the wider public.

The last two criteria of Eitzen and Stewart's definition starkly contrast with the principles of queer theory. While queer is a strong ideology, and widely analyzed by numerous academics and advocates alike, there is no organizational structure advocating on behalf of queer individuals. In contrast, queer advocacy seeks to reject all forms of societal organization, as mobilizing through societal institutions serves to further validate institutional legitimacy.ⁱ As Butler notes, using the "norm" as a point of comparison is paradoxical, as even claiming to be outside of the norm still enforces that "normalcy" exists.ⁱⁱ As queer advocates are dispersed among a host of minority gender and sex identification groupings, there is no unified 'queer leadership,' which is a key component of Eitzen and Stewart's definition.

While queer theorists object to societal integration, queer advocates may nevertheless 'package' themselves in a fashion which resonates with mainstream society.

While 'queering' identity is an alternative mode of thinking which encourages individuals to challenge 'gender norms,' it also emphasizes that there is no one 'right' way to identify. Therefore, a queer advocate will never attempt to indoctrinate an individual into queer thought, but will rather assert the need to accept all individuals who experience gender-based discrimination. In rejecting overarching societal structures, queer theory does not possess any identifiable political mobilization strategy. While individuals may 'queer' more conservative forms of identity politics, queer is not a viable, stand-alone mobilization tactic. While Eitzen and Stewart identify the endpoint of a successful social movement as integration into society, queer theorists do not see conformity as the end goal of 'queering' identity politics.

While queer theorists object to societal *integration*, queer advocates may nevertheless 'package' themselves in a fashion which *resonates* with mainstream society. Ultimately, some prominent queer theorists try to relate to the greater population by using the terms 'queer' and 'transgender' as adjectives.ⁱⁱⁱ For example, the spectrum approach to gender claims that "we are all transgendered" and "all gender is drag,"^{liii} which simplifies otherwise complex categories of gender identification. Regardless of this rhetoric, in refusing to subscribe to current political mobilization tactics, 'queer' is not a social movement. Evidently, however, queer thought can be harnessed by certain chapters of less conservative, identity-based social movements who take refuge in 'queer' identity.

Practical Applications of Queer Theory

Finally, there are some issues with respect to the practical application of queer theory, which rejects conventional recognition strategies. Butler defines identity recognition as "the process that is engaged when subject and 'Other' understand themselves to be reflected in one another;" however, for recognition to be successful, the one cannot

“collapse into the Other.”^{liv} In Canada, current grounds-based approaches to discrimination under s.15 of the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* do not capture the complex, multi-faceted nature of identity.^{lv} By using a grounds-based approach to discrimination, Canada’s *Charter* requires individuals to mobilize under pre-defined categories; this ultimately fails to capture the complex nature of oppression or subjective account of identity.^{lvi} Therefore, the ‘pre-packaged’ nature of rights claiming in Canada is counter-intuitive to queer theory’s goal of recognizing gender as inherently fluid and unstable.

As Piontek argues, and as Halberstam affirms with the confusion surrounding his gender identity,^{lvii} gender ambiguity makes the general population uneasy.^{lviii} For children, while language descriptors are “contingent, illusionary, immotile, and impermanent,”^{lix} adults depend on these very distinctions for legal, social, and political order. Interestingly, Cathy J. Cohen argues that while the concept of ‘queering’ identity holds great theoretical potential, it falls short in practice.^{lx} She argues that current applications of queer theory do not challenge the ‘norm,’ but rather serve to exacerbate the differences between heterosexual normativity and ‘Other,’ alternate identity constructs.^{lxi} Queer theory’s presiding focus on gender and sex may actually inhibit the acknowledgment of other forms of oppression involving race, gender, and class.^{lxii} As an umbrella category fostering ‘global acceptance,’ queer’s emphasis on gender and sex has the potential to ignore the experiences of working class and ethno-cultural minorities.

Love views queer as a potential “political force in the context of struggles for gender and sexual freedom,” due to its ability to “convey the ongoing realities of stigma, violence, and exclusion.”^{lxiii} As demonstrated, however, many feminist, lesbian and gay rights advocates are hesitant to ‘queer’ their movements. Surely, gender ambiguity is contentious in a society premised on sexist and gendered political, legal, and social distinctions. In addition to facing backlash from mainstream Western society, ‘queering’ individuals face hostility from other marginalized segments of the population, such as numerous feminist, gay and lesbian activist groups. As queer individuals reject societal institutions perpetuating ‘normalcy,’ this proves to be challenging when institutionalization is the objective of social movements. Conversely, the more queer thought becomes institutionalized, the less reformative power it holds as both a theory and as a potential aid to existing identity-based movements.

Conclusion

This paper sought to prove that, while a critical stream of thought, ‘queering’ one’s identity does not single-handedly constitute a social movement; nor does queer thought seek such a label. As queer thought inherently rejects social classification schemes, identifying as a social movement would contradict its purpose. Using Eitzen and Stewart’s definition of a social movement, this paper explored the production of queer space within current LGBTQ rights claiming frameworks. It examined the varied use of the label ‘queer’ within the LGBTQ community, highlighting the ways in which active association or dissociation from the term aids certain rights claiming groups. Several practical applications of queer theory were then explored, showcasing its potential in affecting substantive change. While lacking in sufficient potential in the eyes of several theorists, and ridiculed among certain disenfranchised gay, lesbian, and feminist groups, queer thought may ultimately, and

ironically, increase the effectiveness of these movements as it becomes further aligned with mainstream thought.

Endnotes

- ⁱ Riki Wilchins defines 'transgender' as individuals who 'transgress' gender norms without undergoing medical intervention. Nevertheless, transsexuals (those undergoing medical intervention) are often included under the umbrella term 'transgendered.' See Riki Wilchins, "Deconstructing Trans," in *GenderQueer: Voices from Beyond the Sexual Binary*, ed. Joan Nestle, Clare Howell, and Riki Wilchins (New York: Alyson Books, 2002), 58.
- ⁱⁱ Cathy J. Cohen, "Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?" *GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies* 3 no. 4 (1997): 439.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Heather Love, "Queer," *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly* 1 (2014), 172.
- ^{iv} Jan Simon Hutta defines politics of inclusion as 'assimilationist' identity politics which attempt to obtain recognition within existing societal frameworks. See Jan Simon Hutta, "Beyond the Politics of Inclusion: Securitization and Agential Formations in Brazilian LGBT Parades," in *Queer Futures: Reconsidering Ethics, Activism, and the Political*, ed. Elahe Haschemi Yekani (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013), 67.
- ^v Wilchins, "Deconstructing Trans," 63.
- ^{vi} Cohen, "Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens," 439.
- ^{vii} Shannon Price Minter, "Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real about Transgender Inclusion," in *Transgender Rights*, ed. Paisely Currah, Richard M. Juang and Shannon Price Minter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 143.
- ^{viii} Dean Spade, "Methodologies of Trans Resistance." In *A Companion to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Studies*, ed. George E. Haggerty and Molly McGarry (Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 241.
- ^{ix} Wilchins, "Deconstructing Trans," 56.
- ^x Minter, "Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights," 148.
- ^{xi} Thomas Piontek, *Queering Gay and Lesbian Studies* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 82.
- ^{xii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xiii} *Ibid.*, 83.
- ^{xiv} Minter, "Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights," 142.
- ^{xv} *Ibid.*, 154.
- ^{xvi} *Ibid.*, 142.
- ^{xvii} Spade, "Methodologies of Trans Resistance," 237.
- ^{xviii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xix} Wilchins, "Deconstructing Trans," 62.
- ^{xx} *Ibid.*, 60.
- ^{xxi} Spade, "Methodologies of Trans Resistance," 238.
- ^{xxii} Lori Chambers, "Unprincipled Exclusions: Feminist Theory, Transgender Jurisprudence and Kimberly Nixon," *Canadian Journal of Women and the Law* 19, no. 2 (2007): 315.
- ^{xxiii} *Ibid.*, 313.
- ^{xxiv} *Ibid.*, 311.
- ^{xxv} Wilchins, "Deconstructing Trans," 60.
- ^{xxvi} Minter, "Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights," 152.
- ^{xxvii} *Ibid.*, 143.
- ^{xxviii} *Ibid.*, 151-152.
- ^{xxix} Wilchins, "Deconstructing Trans," 57.
- ^{xxx} *Ibid.*
- ^{xxxi} J. Jack Halberstam, *Gaga Feminism: Sex, Gender, and the End of Normal* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2012), 15.
- ^{xxxii} *Ibid.*
- ^{xxxiii} *Ibid.*, 13.
- ^{xxxiv} Chambers, "Unprincipled Exclusions," 314.
- ^{xxxv} *Ibid.*, 306.
- ^{xxxvi} "Feminists Protect the Idea of a Woman-Only Space: One Center's Fight in Response to a Human Rights Complaint," *Vancouver Rape Relief*, 2006, <http://www.rapereliefshelter.bc.ca/learn/resources/feminists-protect-idea-woman-only-space-one-centres-fight-response-human-rights-comp>
- ^{xxxvii} *Ibid.*

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- xxxviii "Vancouver Rape Relief Response to Vancouver Sun Article 'Women Felt Humiliated by Rape Relief,'" *Vancouver Rape Relief*, 2000, <http://www.rapereliefshelter.bc.ca/learn/resources/vancouver-rape-relief-response-vancouver-sun-article-woman-felt-humiliated-rape-reli>
- xxxix Ibid.
- xl Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 89.
- xli Ibid.
- xlii Halberstam, *Gaga Feminism*, 16.
- xliii Ibid., 17-18.
- xliv Stanley D. Eitzen and Kenneth L. Stewart, *Solutions to Social Problems from the Bottom Up: Successful Social Movements*, (Allyn & Bacon, 2007).
- xlvi Ibid.
- xlvii Ibid.
- xlviii Ibid.
- xlix Ibid.
- ¹ Butler, *Undoing Gender*, 41.
- li Ibid.
- lii Wilchins, "Deconstructing Trans," 61.
- liii Ibid.
- liv Butler, *Undoing Gender*, 133.
- lv Chambers, "Unprincipled Exclusions," 323.
- lvi Ibid.
- lvii In *Gaga Feminism*, Halberstam discusses how his "gender regularly confuses strangers" who are discomfited by his ambiguous and non-conforming gender. See Halberstam, *Gaga Feminism*, 10.
- lviii Piontek, *Queering Gay and Lesbian Studies*, 67.
- lix Halberstam, *Gaga Feminism*, 14.
- lx Cohen, "Punks, Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens," 440.
- lxi Ibid.
- lxii Ibid.
- lxiii Love, "Queer," 172.

#SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen: Can a Hashtag Constitute a Social Movement?

Aramide Odutayo

Abstract

Can a simple hashtag constitute a social movement? The answer is a resounding yes. Using the definition of a social movement proposed in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* as a framework, this paper illustrates that #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen is a perfect example of how social media and social movements have intersected to inspire profound change. Created by blogger and black feminist scholar Mikki Kendall, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen highlighted the justified resentment that many black feminists have against the white liberal feminist movement. This paper contends that Kendall's hashtag activism satisfies the fundamental characteristics of a social movement because it was a coordinated, collective, and sustained attempt by marginalized voices outside of institutional channels to challenge the dominant paradigm: the white liberal feminist approach to gender equality. #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen enabled black feminists to reclaim their intellectual traditions and advance black feminist thought by highlighting the voices of women who are not commonly perceived as intellectuals and who operate in alternative institutional settings.

Introduction

In the United States, there is a long history of tension between white liberal feminism and the brand of feminism advocated by black feminists. White liberal feminists have long

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argued that gender discrimination is the pre-eminent form of discrimination that women face. They argue that both white and black women will benefit from the eradication of sexism, and that black feminists should therefore stand in solidarity to work towards this shared goal of inclusivity along gendered lines. In response, black feminists have argued that subsuming racism under the cause of sexism ignores the experiences of black women who experience intersecting patterns of racial and gender discrimination.ⁱ In a social movement entitled #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, black feminists stated that solidarity is a notion that centres on the white experience at the expense of racialized women.

To provide context, I will first argue that because the goals of white liberal feminism are often ignorant of the experiences of people of colour, their demand for solidarity in the feminist movement is problematic. Second, I will detail the origins of the #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen movement, specifically outlining the ways in which different types of discrimination intersect in the lives of racialized women. Third, I will consider the various definitions of social movements to settle on one that adequately includes the goals and structures of social media-driven social movements. This definition will then be used as a framework to appraise whether #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen constituted a social movement. This paper concludes that #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen was a social movement based on the following criteria: first, it was a form of collective action outside of institutional channels; second, it challenged existing institutional authority; third, it involved joint action, with some degree of coordination, in pursuit of a common objective; and fourth, it operated with some degree of temporal continuity. Finally, implications of #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen for the future of black feminist thought are discussed.

White Liberal Feminism and Black Feminism: Tensions

A brief glimpse into the history of the white liberal feminist movement in the United States and Black feminist reveals tensions that are manifest in the origins of #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen. Racial discrimination was a mainstay of the white liberal feminist movement. In 1870, several white American suffragists opposed the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment that allowed African American men to vote, because they felt that black men should not be enfranchised before white women.ⁱⁱ One of the leaders of the American suffragist movement, Francis Willard, also endorsed the Klu Klux Klan's practice of lynching, as Southern blacks were perceived as a threat to the safety of women, children, and the home.ⁱⁱⁱ When black suffragist Ida Wells confronted Willard, he and other white feminists unapologetically silenced her because she had transgressed a foundational principle of the white liberal feminist movement: "Women don't criticize other women. They stand in solidarity."^{iv}

The assertion by white liberal feminists that all women should stand in solidarity and work towards a mutual goal of inclusivity is problematic because black feminists, who are cognizant of the way in which race and class intersect in structuring gender, historically have not been equal participants in the white liberal feminist movement.^v Consequently, black feminists have condemned white feminist movement for being racist and fixated on the concerns of white, middle-class women.^{vi} For example, the feminism espoused by white liberal feminists calls for equality and typically focuses on policies that privilege the

integration of white women into the existing order.^{vii} One of the most quoted policy prescriptions is ending the gender pay gap that pays women 77 cents for every dollar a man earns.^{viii} In response, black feminists assert this commonly cited fact as being disingenuous and indicative of the lack of diversity in the white liberal feminist movement. In reality, white women earn 77 percent of white men's earnings, and black women and Hispanic or Latina women earn 64 cents and 54 cents, respectively, for every dollar white men earn.^{ix} White women also have a greater percentage of earnings relative to black, Hispanic or Latino, and indigenous men.^x Ultimately, the ignorance of many white liberal feminists regarding the racial dynamics of the gender pay gap validates black feminists' demands for justice as opposed to equality.^{xi} Black feminists recognize that because of America's history of discrimination based on race and class, contemporary struggles for social justice need to be fundamentally transformed before black women can successfully integrate into the system.^{xii}

At the academic level, many white liberal feminist scholars have resisted working with black women, and this historical suppression of black feminist thought has had a pronounced influence on feminist theory.^{xiii} First, the silencing of black feminism has created a pattern of omission.^{xiv} Upon closer examination, black feminists have realized that popular theories that are advanced as being applicable to all women are limited by the white middle-class origins of the scholars.^{xv} For example, Nancy Chodorow's text on sex role socialization and Carol Gilligan's study on the moral development of women both rely heavily on white, middle-class samples.^{xvi} Although these two texts have made pronounced contributions to feminist practice, they simultaneously promote the idea of a universal woman who is white and from the middle-class.^{xvii} Most importantly, the absence of black feminist sensibilities from these and other studies impedes their ability to challenge the way in which mainstream scholarship omits the experiences of racialized women.^{xviii}

Black feminists, who are cognizant about how race and class intersect in structuring gender, historically have not been equal participants in the white liberal feminist movement.

A second pattern of suppression is made evident by the fact that white liberal feminist struggle for diversity does not extend to diversifying the practices of the feminist movement itself.^{xix} Specifically, many feminist scholars omit women of colour from their work—even while conducting work on social exclusion.^{xx} This exclusion is often justified through a qualification: that they are unqualified to understand or discuss the experiences of black women because they themselves are not black.^{xxi} Other white liberal feminist scholars handpick a few token black feminist voices to avoid accusations of racism.^{xxii} This behaviour fosters a climate where symbolic inclusion is substituted for significant, substantive change. Ultimately, both tendencies reflect the unwillingness by many white liberal feminists to alter the paradigms that influence their work.^{xxiii} Both of these omissions on the part of the mainstream feminist movement have caused tensions between white liberal feminist advocacy and black feminist activism.

#SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen

The historical tension between white liberal feminists and black feminists is reflected in the origins of the hashtag #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen. #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen rose to prominence following Hugo Schwyzer's fall from grace.^{xxiv} Schwyzer was an American college professor of gender studies, a blogger, and a self-described male feminist.^{xxv} Many black feminists were aggravated that white liberal feminism had allowed Schwyzer, who had admitted to the attempted murder of an ex-girlfriend and to engaging in sexual relationships with students, to continue gain exposure through endorsements from influential feminist bloggers.^{xxvi} Black women also criticized him for using his platform to exclude black feminists in a defence of white liberal feminism.^{xxvii} Specifically, Schwyzer stalked and targeted racialized women who criticized his narrow views of feminism and accused him of being opportunistic, abusive, and misogynistic.^{xxviii}

In response, the *Hood Feminism* blogger and activist Mikki Kendall created #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen to express her frustration with many leading white liberal feminist bloggers who did not denounce Schwyzer. Her main concern was that those who worked with Schwyzer failed to acknowledge his targeting of black feminists.^{xxix} Their failure to critically condemn Schwyzer's racism represented a dismissal of his marginalization of black women. This approach favoured of a type of "solidarity" that focuses on the experiences of white women only.^{xxx} Ultimately, Kendall argued that in their handling of Schwyzer, white liberal feminists behaved in a "Willardesque" fashion that went unchallenged due to the same historical call for solidarity.^{xxxi}

What is a Social Movement?

Considering the racial tensions that led to the creation of the hashtag, it is unsurprising that #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen was an ideal forum for black women who were marginalized by white liberal feminist thought and practice to express their grievances. Can these actions be considered a social movement? To answer this question, I first attempt to adopt a definition of 'social movement' that act as a framework through which #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen can be assessed.

A popular definition of 'social movement' is put forward by Stanley Eitzen and Kenneth Stewart. They argue that a social movement is a collective attempt to promote, resist, or reverse change.^{xxxii} For Eitzen and Stewart, a social movement requires "enduring organization with leaders, a division of labor, an ideology, a blueprint for collective action, and a set of roles and norms for the members."^{xxxiii} Although strategies and organizational skills are important, Eitzen and Stewart hold that ideology is the key to a movement's success.^{xxxiv} They argue that ideology can be elaborate (e.g. Christianity) or narrow (e.g. abortion), and that ideology provides the rationale for seeking change, unites diverse groups of people working towards a common cause, and prioritizes the movement over the individual.^{xxxv}

Eitzen and Stewart's definition is problematic because it is antithetical to the goals of hashtag campaigns and the nature of social media platforms such as Twitter. For

example, the requirement that social movements have leaders and a division of labor is incompatible with #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen because the benefit of hashtag activism is that it allows for coordination without formal, sustained, or hierarchical organization.^{xxxvi} Furthermore, the demand for a set of roles and norms for the members of a social movement is too restrictive and is incompatible with the fluid nature of social media.^{xxxvii} Finally, the privileging of ideology, which calls for unity and the submersion of the individual in favour of the movement, echoes the restrictive call for solidarity made by white liberal feminists. Ultimately, it is the need for rigid structures and the prioritizing of ideology that tends to marginalize minority voices, as is evident in the white liberal feminist movement, therefore rendering this definition problematic.

Conversely, Blackwell's argues that a social movement "can be thought of as collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part."^{xxxviii} This definition is superior for analyzing and trying to understand the way in which virtual communication might give rise to social movements because it is cognizant of the horizontal, disperse, and fluid organizing structures of hashtag activism, and is therefore a more inclusive definition of a social movement.^{xxxix}

Is #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen A Social Movement?

Using Blackwell's definition as a framework, the remainder of this paper will illustrate why Kendall's hashtag campaign fulfills the characteristics of a social movement.^{xl} First, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen was a form of collective action outside of institutional channels because the goal of Kendall's hashtag was to subvert joint actions that are institutionalized or normatively sanctioned, specifically in the white liberal feminist movement. This hashtag campaign also entailed the pursuit of a common objective—namely, illustrating the flaws of the white liberal feminist movement—through joint action.^{xli} #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen started a discussion among individuals who were marginalized by the mainstream feminist movement. For over four hours, it was the most popular Twitter hashtag in the United States, and for forty minutes it was the third most popular in the world.^{xlii} The hashtag trended in sixty-one American cities, landed in first place in twenty-one of those regions, and was used by an estimated seven million people to offer support, curiosity, or condemnation.^{xliii}

The goal of Kendall's hashtag was to subvert joint actions that are institutionalized or normatively sanctioned.

For example, one tweeter stated that white liberal feminists were guilty of racially motivated bias when they condemned black feminist Rihanna's traditional Caribbean inspired outfit for being inappropriate, but later applauded white liberal feminist Lena Dunham for going topless.^{xliv} Another tweeter denounced the willful ignorance of white feminists on the fact that white women earn higher wages than black, Hispanic or Latino,

and aboriginal men, in their conversations about the gender pay gap.^{xlv} Muslim feminists also joined the conversation, denouncing FEMEN's insistence on policing the attire of Muslim women and white liberal feminism's failure to evolve into a global movement.^{xlvi} Additionally, the hashtag sparked an honest conversation between feminists about the future of feminism.^{xlvii} A common critique of hashtag feminism is that the natural brevity encouraged by Twitter does not allow for meaningful conversations that some argue is integral to promoting change.^{xlviii} However, Kendall's movement started a productive conversation that spanned multiple days in spite of that brevity.^{xlix}

Critics of the hashtag maintained that it was an abusive weapon that was being used against individuals who were striving for inclusivity.^l Other posts argued that instead of the infighting, supporters of #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen should target their anger toward real oppressors rather than challenge the individuals who are actually allies.^{li} Participants in #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen were condemned, through racially charged language, for claiming that white women are more likely than black women to receive book deals and writing careers.^{lii} The accusation was that black women were included in the broader feminist movement only as a token of diversity and that their contributions were not parlayed into career advancement opportunities.^{liii} One critic tweeted that instead of complaining that publishing companies are reluctant to publish works written by black women, black feminists should "either start their own publishing house, or do what the rest of us do and get their asses to work finding someone to publish them."^{liv} These racist comments suggest that black women and other marginalized groups are overlooked for media attention, and have to struggle disproportionately for recognition within the white liberal feminist movement.^{lv} Ultimately, the analytics behind Kendall's campaign show that the movement involved hundreds of individuals working together to challenge the implicit racial biases of the white liberal feminist movement.

Social movements also serve as challengers to existing institutional authority. In the case of #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, Kendall was taking issue with white liberal feminism's system of beliefs, and the practices reflective of those beliefs.^{lvi} For example, many black feminists stated that the belief that racism experienced by black women is not a feminist problem exemplifies some of the structural problems in the mainstream feminist movement.^{lvii} They maintained that white liberal feminists must not focus solely on the struggles of white middle-class, heterosexual, Western women, and instead must work toward alleviating the plight of racialized, non-middle-class, non-heterosexual, non-cis-gender, and non-Western women.^{lviii} Ultimately, the goal of #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen was to encourage the white liberal feminist movement to strive for a more expansive, inclusive, and just vision of the world.^{lix} This would require that white liberal feminists welcome the experiences of black feminists, who are cognizant of the intersection of race, gender, class, ability, and queer politics.^{lx}

Blackwell also suggests that social movements, as a type of collective action, require joint action in pursuit of a common objective.^{lxi} Joint action of any kind requires some degree of coordination.^{lxii} Scholars debate the relationship between organization and social movements.^{lxiii} Some argue that organization is critical not only for assembling and utilizing resources needed for executing movement campaigns, but that they are also critical to the realization of a movement's goals.^{lxiv} Detractors maintain that excessive emphasis on

coordination is antithetical to effectively mobilizing the voices of marginalized communities.^{lxv} This problem is particularly salient among the working class and the poor, whose precarious economic situations may not be able to commit the time or resources needed to effectively coordinate a social movement.

#SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen serves as an example of a social movement that reconciled these two opposing viewpoints. It can be formally characterized as a multiple networked social movement with a tightly coupled degree of organization, mobilized

***Twitter is a
“leveller”: social
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the distance
between people.***

primarily by members of the working class and working poor.^{lxvi} First, through the use of catchy hashtags with a high shelf life, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, and the sister-movements it triggered, was an effectively organized social movement. This organization is also facilitated by social media, which allows individuals to embed tweets into blogs and articles for popular magazines like *Salon*, and websites like *Storify* that let consumers compile multiple tweets to create a slide show. Furthermore, members of the working class, who are disproportionately people of colour, are not marginalized despite the high level of organization within

the #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen movement. This is because Twitter users are more racially diverse than American Internet users as a whole.^{lxvii} Specifically, black, Hispanic, and Asian-American users together account for 41% of Twitter’s 54 million American users, compared with 34% of Facebook users and 33% of all U.S. Internet users.^{lxviii} This diversity suggests that the movement contained a diversity of voices.

A second important aspect of hashtag campaigns that ensures the empowerment of underserved populations is that Twitter is a “leveller”: social media transcends the distance between people.^{lxix} Since Ida B. Wells, white liberal feminists have dominated the feminist narrative and black women have been pushed to the margins. However, through hashtags, retweets, favorites, and other messages of support posted on the vast public forum provided by the hashtag #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, this status quo was disrupted.^{lxx} Online activism highlights the unique injustices suffered by individuals who stand at multiple intersections of oppression, and illustrates the ability of platforms like Twitter to hold white liberal feminists accountable for their unwitting displays of privilege.^{lxxi} The dialogue sparked by #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen has increased awareness of the various ways that privilege shapes white liberal feminists’ approach to work and community.^{lxxii}

The final element of a social movement concerns the extent to which it operates with some degree of temporal continuity.^{lxxiii} Similarly to organization, continuity exists on a spectrum.^{lxxiv} To constitute a social movement, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen had to work to pursue its objective through persistent collective action.^{lxxv} Accordingly, some degree of prolonged collective actions, and thus temporal continuity, must have been displayed in Kendall’s campaign.^{lxxvi} #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen fulfills the requirement of sustained collective action and temporal continuity because of the many sister movements that have been created as a consequence of its popularity. Specifically, the hashtag encouraged other marginalized groups to begin contesting the current social order.^{lxxvii} This includes #NotYourNarrative, which challenged Western media’s portrayal

of Muslim women, and #NotYourAsianSidekick.^{lxxviii} Aboriginal women were also inspired by Kendall and created the #AmINext campaign, to highlight the issue of murdered and missing indigenous women.^{lxxix}

The Implications of #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen

Ultimately, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen and the sister movements it inspired did generate considerable change in a variety of ways. It challenged the privileges of white liberal feminists by urging the dominant movement to be more attentive to the concerns of individuals standing at the intersection of multiple categories of oppression. Furthermore, it served as a tool to enable black women's broader desire for self-determination and self-expression.^{lxxx} In short, hashtag campaigns such as #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen provide a powerful forum for a wide-ranging community of academics, mothers, veterans, artists, and activists to debate ideas and share experiences.^{lxxxii}

Furthermore, debating ideas and sharing the experiences of black women through #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen also advances the position of the black feminist movement. First, it allows black feminists to reclaim their intellectual traditions.^{lxxxiii} This process is significant because they can then use this knowledge to help contextualize present day oppression. Social media is critical to the process of reclaiming black feminist scholarship because it provides a forum through which subgroups within the larger collectivity of African American women can express their unique concerns.^{lxxxiii} Black lesbians and black trans women can openly reveal their diverse and complex histories, or they can continue to contribute to black feminist thought without disclosing their sexual orientation or gender identity.^{lxxxiv}

Most importantly, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen helped develop black feminist thought by highlighting its expression among women—who are not commonly perceived as intellectuals—in alternative institutional settings.^{lxxxv} Historically, black feminist intellectuals were not all academics, nor were they all members of the black middle class.^{lxxxvi} For example, Sojourner Truth, a nineteenth-century Black feminist activist, was a former slave who did not know how to read and write.^{lxxxvii} Despite that, her most famous speech, *Ain't I A Woman*, delivered at the 1851 Women's Rights Convention, provides an insightful analysis into the construction of the word "woman" both in the mid-1800s and the present day.^{lxxxviii} She exposed the contradictions in her life as a black, second-class citizen: while she was subjected to performing hard, physical labor due to her socioeconomic status, women during this time period were portrayed as delicate and needing the assistance of men; through this contradiction, Sojourner Truth demonstrated that the term "woman" is socially constructed.^{lxxxix} In asking, "and ain't I a woman?", Truth illustrated the historical and present day contradictions inherent in monolithic uses of the term "woman".^{xc} As opposed to accepting the existing assumptions about what constitutes a woman and then try to mold herself to that paradigm, Sojourner Truth challenged the paradigm itself.^{xcii} Demonstrating her capacity for impressive scholarship, Sojourner Truth's efforts demonstrate the process of deconstruction, specifically exposing a concept as socially constructed, rather than accepting it as an accurate reflection of reality.^{xcii}

Mikki Kendall's hashtag campaign mirrors the actions of Sojourner Truth. Kendall, born in south-side Chicago, is a veteran, a mother of two, and works for the Department of Veteran Affairs.^{xciii} However, her decision to harness the diversity of voices available on social media to help situate present-day racism in the language and traditions of former black feminist scholars was a demonstration of considerable intuition. Race, class, and gender are intersecting oppressions in the lives of many black women; however, the ways in which these oppressions are now organized produces social injustice in different forms than in prior eras.^{xciv} Kendall's awareness of this reality and her willingness to openly denounce white liberal feminists' exclusionary practices by magnifying the experiences of those who were formerly silenced has constituted a significant contribution to present-day black feminist practice.

Reclaiming black feminist intellectual traditions through #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen involves much more than debating ideas and sharing the experiences of black women.

Sojourner Truth's and Mikki Kendall's contributions to black feminist practice illustrate why the concept "the intellectual" must be deconstructed.^{xcv} What their stories prove is that contributing to black feminist scholarship does not necessitate a career in academia or a post-graduate degree.^{xcvi} In reality, contributing to black feminist scholarship entails a process of self-conscious struggle and moral activism on behalf of black women, regardless of the actual social location where that work occurs.^{xcvii} Ultimately, reclaiming black feminist intellectual traditions through #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen involves much more than debating ideas and sharing the experiences of black women. It also involves deconstructing the terms of scholarly discourse itself and challenging the institutional locations in which intellectual tradition can be built.^{xcviii} Social movements arising out of hashtags such as #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen provide a platform for this type of deconstructive work.

Conclusion

On the authority of the Blackwell text, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen was a social movement because: it was a form of collective action outside of institutional channels; it challenged existing institutional authority; it involved joint action, with some degree of coordination, in pursuit of a common objective; and it operated with some degree of temporal continuity. Blackwell's definition was selected as the theoretical basis to prove that #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen is a social movement because, unlike Eitzen and Stewart, Blackwell is cognizant of the fluid and inclusive nature of hashtag campaigns and social media. Platforms like Twitter serve as a democratizing force because they magnify the voices of black women, who are rarely singled out as the leaders of social movements. Thus, it is unsurprising that black feminists who felt marginalized by the white liberal feminist movement used Twitter to express their grievances. Ultimately, by sharing the experiences of black women, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen enabled contemporary black feminists to reclaim their intellectual traditions and to develop black feminist thought by

emphasizing its expression among women who are not commonly perceived as intellectuals and who operate in alternative institutional settings.

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Gender Theatre: David Bowie and the Transgression of Gender Norms

Meagan Lobzun

Abstract

Modern day celebrities like Beyonce and Emma Watson have brought feminism into the media again, re-opening the discussion via social media. In the 1970s, it was David Bowie who brought feminism, and all of the gender norms that feminism fought against, to the public's attention. The 1960s marked the beginning of the second wave of feminism, which no longer focused on the fight for suffrage, but rather turned its focus to reproductive rights and sexuality. When David Bowie posed on the cover of his 1971 album *The Man Who Sold the World* in a Mr. Fish "man dress" it marked the beginning of his transgression with prescribed gender norms. Bowie used his androgyny to challenge the stigmas surrounded by femininity, masculinity, homosexuality, transsexuality, and cross dressing. Through entertainment Bowie found a way to challenge gender norms by demonstrating their performativity. This paper posits that David Bowie's physical appearance, lyrics, and performances have helped to challenge the gender norms constructed by society within the framework of many feminisms. A focus will be given to social construction feminism, radical feminism, and post-modern feminism's queer theory.

Introduction

There is more to David Bowie than outrageous outfits and makeup, glam-rock, cocaine, and catchy pop/rock songs; David Bowie has also helped to improve gender equality through his appearance, lyrics and performances. Although Bowie does not identify as a feminist (Watch That Man) he has served as an icon for many people struggling for change that align with many recent types of feminism, such as social construction feminism, radical feminism, and postmodern and queer theory.

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Social construction feminism seeks to break down gender norms by attacking the social structures that produce them. It claims that we are not born as boys and girls, but rather are taught how to become boys and girls.ⁱ David Bowie challenges society's lessons in

Postmodern feminism, and its sub-feminism queer theory, seeks to eradicate considerations of "normal" gender and sexuality.

gender through his appearance in clothing, make-up and hairstyles. The goal of radical feminism is "to end male supremacy in all areas of social and economic life";ⁱⁱ more specifically, it targets white, straight, heterosexual supremacy. Radical feminists often take very public ways of opposing this supremacy much like David Bowie does in his lyrics, which challenge the notions of heterosexuality, fixed gender, and male supremacy. Postmodern feminism, and its sub-feminism queer theory, seeks to eradicate considerations of "normal" gender and sexuality. This feminism argues that "change will come ... when there are so many sexes, sexualities, and genders that one cannot be played against the other as normal and deviant, valued and stigmatized."ⁱⁱⁱ Bowie refused to be typecast as anything and used performance as a way to show how many sexes and sexualities could exist (even in one person).

Boys Can Wear Dresses Too

There is nothing in David Bowie's (born David Jones) childhood to suggest that he grew up with different values than the rest of his generation. In fact, when Bowie was three he got into his mother's make-up bag and plastered his face in power and eyeliner. His mother told him "he shouldn't use make-up," and that "it wasn't for little boys."^{iv} When Bowie first joined the music scene as the saxophonist and occasional violinist for the Kon-Rads he looked just like any 1960s, fifteen-year-old British boy should: wearing a clean well fitted suit with his clean blonde hair styled in "an approximation of a pompadour."^v Similarly, Bowie's first solo album, *David Bowie*, pictured him in a military jacket and a short blonde bob. It was not until his third album in 1971 that Bowie did anything controversial with his appearance—and once he discovered the potential impact of his appearance he decided to do more with it.

The conventional male suit provides a great illustration of how Bowie challenged gender norms with clothing. The suit "remains a staple of the male wardrobe, the only formal wear for men and an exemplar of masculine embodiment."^{vi} On the cover of *The Man Who Sold the World* Bowie rejected the suit and opted for an open chested floral maxi-dress "normally associated with stylish young women" (see Figure 1).^{vii} Bowie had the opportunity to try out this new look in America on a promotional tour which received mixed reactions ranging from "appreciation to confusion and outright aggression."^{viii} This marked the beginning of Bowie's romance with gender-bending costumes.

As Ziggy Stardust, Bowie was inspired by Japanese Kabuki theatre, "a gender-bending theatrical form" in which a change of costume signals a change of personality.^{ix} During this period Bowie dressed in fantastic androgynous costumes for his concerts and music videos which included quilted jumpsuits, leather painted onesie, and many Japanese inspired

costumes of silk suits and kimonos. A particularly good example is the outfit he wore during the song *The Jean Genie* for ‘The 1980 Floor Show’ which was his last show as Ziggy Stardust.^x Bowie’s costume consisted of a black fishnet bodysuit and gold semi-leggings with two gold hands emerging from behind his back and grabbing his chest (see Figure 2).

Bowie is representing both male and female; drag queen and transvestite; straight and gay. This costume does not tell you if Bowie is portraying a woman or a man because he is portraying both and at the same time not portraying anything.

These hands “formed a bizarre brassiere that made it seem as if Bowie had sprouted breasts”;^{xi} however, the hands grabbing Bowie had black painted nails which alluded to drag, since women had mostly abandoned nail polish since the 1960s and black was seen “as a nihilist colour not yet in the female arsenal.”^{xii} Broackes and Marsh offer different interpretations of

what these hands could represent, which include being attacked by a drag queen or woman, and being embraced by a drag queen or woman, but the most prominent interpretation is that Bowie is “split in gender.”^{xiii} Bowie is representing both male and female; drag queen and transvestite; straight and gay. This costume does not tell you if Bowie is portraying a woman or a man because he is portraying both and at the same time not portraying anything; Ziggy Stardust was, after all, a gender ambiguous alien.^{xiv}

Gender roles were “in flux” in the 1960s and ‘70s due to “a convergence of dissident energies from the reawakened women’s movement.”^{xv} Feminists at this time were using clothing as a “tool of change” because it delivered an immediate message.^{xvi} Bowie’s costumes do just that. Like social constructionist feminism, Bowie’s costumes challenged the societal structures that had assigned certain clothing to certain genders. Bowie refused to adopt strictly male or female characters stating that “there is [nothing] remotely glorious about being either male or female.”^{xvii}

“You’re Just a Girl, What Do You Know About Make-up?”

Beyond clothing, Bowie also challenged gender norms with make-up and hairstyles. The simple fact that Bowie, as a man, wore make-up at all was a challenge to gender constrictions, but Bowie went even further and used make-up to play with facial features and create androgynous characters such as the ones found on the cover of *Pin Ups* (see Figure 3). These characters, Bowie and Twiggy (a popular 1960s model), wear make-up that appear like masks. The white make-up not only hides Twiggy’s identity and gender, but the contrast of her tanned skin creates an uncertainty about her race, seeming as if she could be a black man in a female mask.^{xviii} Bowie used the “mask” as a way to draw attention to the fact that anyone can put one on and become anything—that is how easily identity can be constructed.

As previously mentioned, Bowie did not make a controversial album cover until 1971 with his third album, *The Man Who Sold the World*, which features him in a dress. This album cover also features Bowie in waves of long blonde hair, which was not actually uncommon at the time for men (hippie culture had brought it into fashion). Still, the way

his hair cascades down his shoulders, the suggestion from his hand's positioning that he is playing with his hair, and his dress provide a strictly feminine vibe.^{xix} His next album, *Hunky Dory* (see Figure 4), is similar—Bowie is still sporting his long blonde hair, but this time he is smoothing it back with both hands as if posing for a glamour shot. This pose referenced the femininity of the studio-era, Hollywood obsession of the time, which found many female models posing that way for movie posters.^{xx}

Bowie kept his blonde hair long enough to shoot the cover for *The Rise and Fall of Ziggy Stardust and the Spiders from Mars*, but quickly changed it to the staple Ziggy haircut—fire engine red with a “rooster comb of spiky, razor cut.”^{xxi} This haircut further supported the Kabuki style and was feathered to be feminine, but short enough to be masculine.^{xxii} Bowie created Ziggy in such a way that he could not be defined in terms of gender; Ziggy Stardust was beyond gender.

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Radical Lyrics

This essay will now look at the lyrics of three songs that address gender and sexuality and help to break the boundaries associated with those categories. The chosen songs are from three different albums, showing that this is a continual trend in Bowie's music.

Moonage Daydream

The first song is *Moonage Daydream* from the 1972 album *The Rise and Fall of Ziggy Stardust and the Spiders from Mars*. This song is gender neutral, with Bowie/Ziggy referring to itself in gender neutral terms such as “a mama-papa”, but focuses heavily on sexual orientation. After addressing himself as the gender neutral mama-papa, Bowie puts himself in a subordinate position as the other person's “rock n' rollin' bitch”, but then switches to a position of power saying that the person is “squawking like a pink monkey bird” which is gay slang for the recipient of anal sex.^{xxiii} Bowie once again finds himself in the receiving position in the line “put your ray gun to my head” which suggest he will be the one to perform oral sex. Bowie then makes a general declaration of the holiness of homosexuality: “the church of man-love / is such a holy place to be” and challenges the other person to give in and “lay the real thing on [him].” The song fades out with Bowie saying “in out,” creating yet another sexual image of anal or oral sex. David Bowie's blatant references to homosexuality are in line with the radical feminist view that heterosexual male supremacy must be challenged.

Rebel Rebel

Moonage Daydream is in keeping with the theme of gender androgyny, but it is *Rebel Rebel* from the 1974 album *Diamond Dogs* that focuses on gender bending.^{xxiv} The opening lines “You got your mother in a whirl / She's not sure if you're a boy or a girl” provide us with a person whose gender is unclear. The chorus mentions that this person is wearing a dress and make-up, but that the façade is faltering: “Rebel Rebel, you've torn your dress /

Rebel Rebel, your face is a mess / Rebel Rebel, how could they know?" This creates the image of a man in woman's clothing—is this person a transvestite, drag queen, or transsexual? The ambiguity of the person's gender and sexual orientation forces the audience to explore a plethora of possibilities. As Bowie repeats "how could they know?" the audience understands how difficult it is to know how someone identifies and can begin to question why it matters in the first place.

Boys Keep Swinging

The 1979 album *Lodger* provides a satire on male hegemony in the song *Boys Keep Swinging*. This entire song is a mockery of society's idea of what a man should be. It outlines the belief that being a male is better and that life as a boy is the best—"nothing stands in your way when you're a boy". As a boy you get to wear a uniform, get a girl, buy a house, and learn to drive! After all, prestige, women, and material objects are the only things that matter in life. The song is dripping in sarcasm, juxtaposing society's expectations of a boy's life versus what it is like in reality. These lyrics are important to feminism because they show that men need to be liberated from the gender confines created by society (not just women). Everything is not as "hunky dory" for men, especially men of colour and low socioeconomic status, as society would like us to believe. Radical feminists may not agree with this position, but other feminists such as postmodernist and queer theory feminists would argue that everyone needs to be free of gender constrictions.^{xxv}

Some may argue that Bowie did not do anything for gender equality because he was a performer and was motivated by money. He was able to get away with gender bending because celebrities are not "real people"—he was, after all, creating personas and was not necessarily bending gender as David Bowie (which is actually a stage name) but rather as Ziggy Stardust and The Thin White Duke. It is true that the stage has been a refuge for people dealing with gender identity issues and sexual orientation crises,^{xxvi} but that does not mean that Bowie did not help the cause. In fact, Bowie's rock star status helped to spread the message to more people and allowed individuals suffering from gender identity issues to relate to someone, allowing them to come to terms with their fears.^{xxvii} In this way, "Bowie was using stardom as a vehicle to explore deeper personal and social issues."^{xxviii}

Interviews, Stage Antics, and Music Videos: Gender and Sexuality Performed

Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity is important in understanding how Bowie's presentation of himself has helped bridge the gap of gender equality. Butler argues that "genders can be neither true nor false"^{xxix} and that since gender is not a biological fact, "the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, there would be no gender at all."^{xxx} Bowie tests this theory through his complete disregard for gender and gender norms. Bowie was married in 1970 to his first wife Angie with whom he had one daughter.^{xxxi} Even with Bowie's strange stage antics it was assumed by the media and audience that he was either straight or that if he was not straight he would not come out publicly. This all changed in 1972 when, in an interview with *Melody Maker's* Michael Watts, Bowie announced that he was gay and "always [had] been, even when [he] was David Jones."^{xxxii} This was a shocking revelation at the time, since no major celebrity had

ever come out as gay. Because Bowie was married to a woman, it was assumed that he was not bisexual at the most. In 1976, he told one interviewer, “it’s true, I am bisexual” while telling a different interviewer that “that was just a lie.”^{xxxiii} Ten years later, Bowie decided to announce that he was not gay and that it was just a publicity stunt.^{xxxiv} In 2002 a retrospective Bowie announced that it was a way “to get a lot of tension off my shoulders ... it perfectly mirrored my lifestyle at the time. There was nothing I wasn’t willing to try.”^{xxxv} Bowie’s choice not to stick with one sexual orientation shows how performative gender can be.

Queer theory “endeavours to work towards the deconstruction and refusal of labels of personal sexual activity” which Bowie achieves with his ambiguous sexual orientation.^{xxxvi} Bowie showed that, despite a person having certain characteristics, or because society expects those characteristics from them, it does not mean that one can be fully characterized in those particular ways. Queer theory also aims to break down the reliance on organizational models that tell us what things mean.^{xxxvii} David Bowie uses himself as a

David Bowie uses himself as a lens through which the audience may question their own values, providing viewers an alternative to the organizational models that queer theory is trying to break down.

lens through which the audience may question their own values, providing viewers an alternative to the organizational models that queer theory is trying to break down.^{xxxviii}

Ziggy Stardust provides a good example of how Bowie used himself as a lens. Not only did Ziggy’s costumes challenge the meaning of assigned gender, but his actions did as well. During the Ziggy Stardust tour, Bowie would “avidly [mouth] Mick Ronson’s vamping guitar.”^{xxxix} Not only was gay fellatio shocking at the time, but seeing a major male star voluntarily place himself in a subordinate position was almost unthinkable.^{xl} Bowie does not just engage in the shocking, he takes it one step further and challenges people to think about *why* it is shocking. That is the first step in breaking down the organizational models that have been entrenched in society.

David Bowie has only ever dressed in full drag once in the music video for *Boys Keep Swinging*. As previously discussed, the lyrics to this song are heavily satirized with society’s ideal male. The video takes it one step further and features three background singers, which are really three different versions of Bowie in drag, that represent three different types of women. The first is a working class fifties-type girl that one may expect to deliver a milkshake on rollerblades, the second is a dazzling “Lauren Bacall clone,” and the third is an elderly “Dietrich-Garbo.”^{xli} The “lead singer” is Bowie in a typical masculine suit, who fits the description of the boys described in the lyrics. The irony lies in the fact that even though Bowie can look like society’s ideal boy, he clearly is not, based on the three drag versions of him. Bowie uses this video to take gender performativity to its limit by playing man and woman, young and old, average and glamorous. He shows how arbitrary the labels are by being all of them.

Conclusion

It has been 47 years since David Bowie produced his first record and began his long journey through gender theatre, but even today Bowie is remembered for pushing gender boundaries. In his 2013 music video *Stars (Are Out Tonight)* a young androgynous looking female plays a younger version of Bowie, complete with dilated pupils. Most surprising of Bowie's journey through gendered society is that he was never a gay rights or women's rights advocate. He does not identify with "isms" (*Watch That Man*). He tackles gender and sexual equality from an almost passive stance. David Bowie does not try to be anything—David Bowie just is. He can go from make-up wearing, high-heel loving, full on drag to conservative, straight, male; he can go from Ziggy Stardust to The Thin White Duke. The following quote from Broackes and Marsh captures why David Bowie has been so successful in addressing gender equality: "Bowie's mesmerizing theatre of costume, music and dance is animated by mercurial yet profound emotion – the universal language that transcends gender."^{xiii}

Appendix



Figure 1. David Bowie's *The Man Who Sold the World* album cover which displays him in a Michael Fish man-dress and feminine hair


Macmillan, Keith. *The Man Who Sold the World*. April 1971. Mercury (UK).



*Figure 2. David Bowie's gender ambiguous costume for The 1980 Floor Show
Rock, Mick. The 1980 Floor Show. 1973.*



Figure 3. David Bowie and Twiggy on the cover of *Pin Ups* de Villeneuve, Justin. *Pin Ups*. 1973.



*Figure 4. David Bowie smoothing his hair back on the cover of *Hunky Dory**
Ward, Brian. *Hunky Dory*. 1971.

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A Question of ‘Greenness’: Regulatory Politics and the EU International Environmental Policy Regime

Talitha Cherer

Abstract

Efforts on behalf of the international community to mobilize and shift in a green direction are intensifying. The European Union stands apart from its global counterparts, acting as a leader in environmental protection efforts. However, although the EU’s green policies have been very successful, its progression will invariably be limited by the non-altruistic underlying drive for this ‘greenness’—its competitive market strategy. The EU’s progressive ‘green’ policy is derived from its competitive market strategy goals to create a level playing field between its own member states, as well as between the whole bloc and the international community. This goal is referred to as “regulatory politics” and is based on the premise that by convincing its competitors to abide by these environmental standards, the EU is shielding its industries from competitive disadvantages and, therefore, protecting its own markets from suffering. This essay assesses the EU’s green global leadership through the lens of regulatory politics; however, it should be noted that although the EU’s motivation for creating and implementing green policy may be limiting, it has still elevated it to a definite status of ‘green’ and has allowed for immense progress in global environmental governance that is beneficial for all.

Introduction

Today, the environment is at the top of many countries’ and policy-makers’ agendas. As the negative effects of climate change are becoming more apparent, there is a realization that concerted action must be taken. The European Union has set model standards for the rest of the world in ‘greening’ its economy. As an ‘environmental pusher,’ the EU has been the

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forefront of action to institute progressive green policies at both the domestic and international level. The EU is certainly considered ‘green’, arguably the *most* green in the world, but its flaws remain. Although the EU’s green policies have been very successful, its progression will invariably be limited by the non-altruistic underlying drive for this ‘greenness’—its competitive market strategy. The EU’s progressive ‘green’ policy is derived from its competitive market strategy goals to create a level playing field between its own member states, as well as between the whole bloc and the international community. This

The EU’s true motivation for creating ‘green’ policy stems from regulatory political goals.

goal will be referred to as “regulatory politics”ⁱ for the remainder of this essay. The EU’s true motivation for creating ‘green’ policy stems from regulatory political goals, which simultaneously acts as both the greatest weakness and strength of the EU in its effectiveness as a progressive leader in global environmental governance.

To provide context, a brief background on the development of the EU as a leader in international environmental law will be provided and, subsequently, the theory of ‘regulatory politics’ will be outlined. It is argued that regulatory political scheming is the motivation that catalyzes the EU’s progressive green policies. The focus will then shift to the actors behind this motivation: whose agenda does EU greenness benefit? The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the forestry protection regime negotiations spanning from 1983 to 2001 will be used as case studies to expose the UE’s overarching environmental policy motivation and assess the impact this motivation has on furthering ‘green’ goals.

A Brief Background

Following the UN Stockholm Convention of 1972, as well as a series of environmental crises, public and scientific concern about the environment was on the rise.ⁱⁱ At the Paris Summit in 1972, leaders pushed European environmental policy forward by interpreting the treaty text in a manner that made environmental policy an essential goal of the Community.ⁱⁱⁱ European Community leaders rose to the challenge, producing the First Environmental Action Programme (EAP) in November of 1973.^{iv} The 1973 EAP was the first example of official EU environmental policy. It established the idea that economic development and environmental protection are interconnected, focusing on the “prevention, reduction and containment of environmental damage, the conservation of an ecological equilibrium, and the rational use of natural resources” as its main objectives.^v This EAP marked the start of the EU environmental regime and “within about a decade a very substantial set of European environmental laws had emerged, with many important areas of environmental policy being regulated at the European level.”^{vi}

European environmental policy came with the creation The Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. The SEA explicitly declared environmental policy to be a “community policy” and laid out objectives such as preserving the quality of the environment, the prudent and rational utilization of natural resources, and more.^{vii} Subsequent treaties, such as the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, have detailed the importance of environmental protection on the EU agenda and strengthened EU level regulation of

environmental policies. The EU expanded its progressive environmental drive outside of its borders, “emerging as a leading supporter of every major international environmental treaty since 1989.”^{viii} The EU has been instrumental in international discussions and treaty concerning the environment, replacing the U.S. as active environmental pusher on the world stage. There is no denying the exemplary role the EU has played both domestically and internationally with environmental policy implementation. However, the question remains as to *why* it is so involved and *who* is behind this extraordinary progress.

The EU's Motivation

The underlying motivation of the EU's leadership role in environmental activism must be explained. In search of this explanation, the theory of regulatory politics stands apart from the numerous alternative theories and literature on the subject. Regulatory politics “combines the effects of domestic politics and international regulatory competition”^{ix} in its explanation of the EU's progressive environmental policy. The theory argues that “given the EU's commitment to high standards and the exposure of EU firms to international competition, it is in the competitive interests of the EU to support international agreements that will pressure other states to adopt similarly costly regulations.”^x In essence, the EU is attempting to ‘level the playing field’ by coercing its competition to comply with the same environmental standards as the EU. However, adopting green solutions comes with a price

In essence, the EU is attempting to ‘level the playing field’ by coercing their competition to comply with the same environmental standards as the EU. However, adopting green solutions comes with a price tag.

tag. Environmentally friendly alternatives are often exceedingly more expensive than the environmentally degrading options. Green technology is a difficult investment for countries to make, as it is very expensive while the results are not immediate. By convincing its competitors to abide by these environmental standards, the EU is shielding its industries from competitive disadvantages and therefore, protecting its own markets from suffering.

It is important to recognize competing theories in the debate on the EU's environmental activism. One could argue that environmental issues must be addressed internationally because they affect the entire globe. It is clear that “any state committed to solving these issues will be inclined to support cooperative, international efforts designed to address them.”^{xi} This is a valid argument, but it does not account for the scope of the EU's commitment to addressing environmental issues. The EU is not the *average* international actor, but rather the absolute leader in global environmental governance.^{xii} A second argument suggests that due to prosperity and wealth, higher public support and governmental propensity for environmental policy will ensue.^{xiii} There is a positive correlation between wealth and ratification, but this connection does not explain a state's willingness to lead.^{xiv} In fact, according to this conclusion, the U.S. should be the current environmental leader.^{xv} However, the United States lags behind the EU in innovative green policies. A third argument follows a social-constructivist perspective, suggesting that

international environmental treaties are ‘constructed’ by a ‘world environmental regime’ that pressures states into feeling that they must enact behaviours expected by other modern states.^{xvi} This sort of international ‘peer pressure’ is felt by the states most deeply embedded in world society.^{xvii} This theory fails to explain why other advanced and ‘embedded’ countries such as the U.S., Canada, or Australia have not asserted leadership like the EU.^{xviii} One final alternative argument explains the EU’s leadership role as the result of the EU’s efforts to create an identity as a ‘normative’ power on the world stage.^{xix} According to this line of thought, the EU has focused on nurturing this reputation because it lacks in other areas, such as foreign policy. However, this theory is not comprehensive enough to fully describe the depth of the EU’s involvement. Reputation is simply not sufficient to explain the intensity of the EU’s leadership in global environmental governance. Through this description of a number of the alternative theories on the EU’s international environmental leadership, it is clear that none adequately explain this phenomenon. The theory of regulatory politics is the strongest option with its focus on domestic pressures and economics.

The Actors

In understanding the EU’s primary motivation, it is necessary to reveal *who* exactly is behind the EU’s environmental leadership. In this regard, the interests of the supranational institutions of the EU—namely the European Commission and European Parliament—are worth examining. Initially, the EC was established to bind states for economic and defence purposes. The Common Market was the key focus, with member states coming together in hopes of reaping economic benefits. The biggest sector of the Common Market was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), introduced in 1962 with the Treaty of Rome.^{xx} Serving as a price fixing mechanism with no maximum quota, the CAP resulted in hyper-increased agricultural production. This increased agricultural activity led to environmental degradation as soil was depleted of nutrients, previously unused land was cleared, and reliance on fertilizers and hormones increased.^{xxi} The realization that agricultural market practices were not feasible in the long term was only one of many pressures that pushed member states into conceding to supranational environmental governance. Increasing environmental cross-border mishaps highlighted that these issues could not be handled by a single member state alone.^{xxii} Germany and other green states recognize that uniform environmental policy would protect from environmental degradation by neighbours (ex. transboundary pollution issues) and would be economically beneficial by levelling the playing field between competitive industries within the EU. Previously, member states had national measures to protect the environment, which they each implemented to varying degrees.^{xxiii} The best place for harmonization was clearly the European level.

The Paris Summit of 1972 marked the supranational institutions first taste of environmental policy. Article 2 of the treaty allowed for the interpretation that environmental policy should be an essential goal of the European Community^{xxiv} while Article 94 “contained general authorization for the Community to harmonize legal and administrative regulation ... which have direct ramifications for the establishment and functioning of the Common Market”^{xxv}. The advancement of supranational control of EU environmental policy came with the SEA in 1986, when environmental policy was explicitly

declared to be a task of the EC.^{xxvi} The Commission and Parliament both “hoped for new methods of political influence by enhancing their environmental policy authority”^{xxvii} and their wish was granted. The SEA allowed the Commission to intrude into new areas of environmental policy and develop measures that would not have been justified before.^{xxviii} The following Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties further increased institutional and legal underpinnings of European environmental policy, specifically through the creation of the European Environmental Agency in 1987, and the move to qualified majority voting for decision-making in Parliament.^{xxix} The EU environmental policy regime continued to blossom as subsequent treaties and agreements continued to increase its power. For example, with the Fifth EAP in 1993, the Commission was granted financial instruments for the environment^{xxx}. The EC also made new accession requirements that force “applicant countries to transpose almost all of existing Community environmental law into their national legislation and ... policies”.^{xxxi} With this incremental process of the EU, supranational institutions are becoming intertwined with environmental policy and increasing their power and influence.

The Commission, Parliament, and ECJ realized at the onset that becoming involved in the regulation and implementation of environmental policy would open the doors to access in other policy areas. They realized that getting involved with environmental policy had two major benefits. Firstly, it would connect them to the concerned public by proving that the “Community was relevant to them and responsive to their worries”.^{xxxii} Secondly, relating back to regulatory politics, it was clear that uniform standards would prevent market distortions and protect the Common Market^{xxxiii}—the most significant concern to the EU supranational bodies as this is where they derived most of their power from. The success of the supranational actors in EU environmental policy reflects a neo-functionalist understanding of European integration in this area. As neo-functionalism predicts, “interest-driven” national and supranational elites [the powerful green member states and their industries], recognizing the limitations of national solutions [their individual national green policies], provide the key impetus^{xxxiv} towards movement to integration. The theory also predicts that “once established, institutions can take a life of their own and progressively escape the control of their creators”^{xxxv} which is certainly the case in this policy area. In fact, some member states such as Spain, Greece, and Ireland appear to take policy from the EU, showing compliance to the policy requirements placed upon them.^{xxxvi} There are times where “Europeanization” has been “hugely unexpected, unpredictable and, at times, chaotic process”^{xxxvii} and there are certainly examples where each member state has been “forced to develop new environmental policy coordination mechanisms.”^{xxxviii} It appears these actors have grown out of the control of member states on the issue of environmental policy. With the ability to monitor state compliance, to issue financial aid and incentive, and to set environmental law precedent, the EU supranational bodies have used this progress to expand their reach into other policy sectors as well. It is these supranational bodies that drive the motivation of the EU in international environmental politics. It serves *their* interests as they have control of domestic environmental politics, and international influence only furthers their power. The supranational bodies will always remain tied to the success of the EU’ economy. Now that they have succeeded in leveling the playing field internationally, they will attempt to do so domestically as well.

As the actors that drive the motivation of the EU's international environmental activism have been established, it is clear how the competitive market strategy was born and the era of regulatory politics in the EU began with full force. The EU has been a relentless player on the world stage, albeit to mixed results. In the next section, some of the EU's most notable achievements, as well as failures in global environmental governance will be highlighted to reveal how the motivation of regulatory politics is both a weakness and strength in its quest to be truly green.

Achievement of the EU

The EU has made countless achievements in its leadership role in international environmental policy, but one of the most memorable is the EU's role in the success of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Kyoto was a notable triumph for the international climate change regime. Its first commitment period from 2008-2012 set up binding emissions reduction targets of 37 industrialized countries and the European community.^{xxxix} More recently, the second commitment period has begun, running from 2013 to 2020^{xl} and establishing bold new targets. The EU has the goal of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20% for EU27 by 2020 compared with 1990 levels.^{xli} The leadership role of the EU in the international climate regime cannot be denied. Its success can be chiefly attributed to the "constant and decisive efforts of the European Commission."^{xlii} The EU introduced a number of flexibility mechanisms that aided in the success of Kyoto, notably the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). CDM allows for Annex 1 countries (mostly the developed countries) to "take credit of emissions reduced through a CDM project in a developing country to meet their targets."^{xliii} The idea behind CDM is that "one ton of GHG reduced anywhere in the world has the same effect on the climate."^{xliv} As long as the host country can prove the success of the CDM emissions reductions, it can count these projects towards its own goals. This is beneficial to the EU, as it allows its domestic industries to continue producing emissions, if need be, while setting the new standard for emissions in the developing world. By setting the standard, the EU is ensuring that the developing world will be bound by the same environmental standards as it becomes more integrated into the industrialized economy, effectively establishing a level playing field for the future.

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Another important mechanism that highlights the success of the supranational EU actors to protect their interests, while simultaneously protecting the environment, is the "burden sharing agreement" (BSA). Emissions reduction targets are placed on the EU as a whole, so the division of targets among member states depends on the EU. Placing the Common Market at the forefront, the supranational EU actors use the BSA to prevent unmanageable target goals from being placed on the weaker EU member states—namely Eastern Europe. By aggregating responsibility with BSA, the weaker (and still developing) EU member states can continue their environmentally degrading practices that are

sometimes necessary for rapid economic growth, while the wealthier states carry the brunt of the burden. It can reasonably be predicted that individual states would not agree to accept disadvantageous responsibility for meeting emission requirements; therefore, the agreement must be explained by pressures from supranational actors. The Commission holds fast to its right to protect the Common Market, and justifies any expansion on to sovereign rights of member states as “necessary” for the Common Market success.

Another flexibility mechanism, through which the EU has reached success in Kyoto, is the emissions trading system (EMS). The parties to Kyoto are assigned different amounts of emissions allowances based on a number of criteria. EMS “usually occurs when a party has a surplus of units and these are offered for sale to other parties, mainly for reasons of the latter’s compliance with the limitation and reduction commitments.”^{xlv} The EU’s EMS is the world’s biggest carbon market and is used to incentivize the investment in low-carbon technologies.^{xlvi} Having in place an EMS stimulates market growth as investment in green technology increases. Technically, the EU is also able to circumvent overbearing emissions reductions by buying out GHG allowances if necessary.

These flexibility mechanisms put in place by the supranational actors of the EU, namely the Commission, reveal how innovative EU leaders can be in their determination to create an equal international playing field. Kyoto is a landmark success for the EU, solidifying their international leadership role. Consider that the parties to the treaty “accounted in total for at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990”^{xlvii} upon its ratification. The EU was able to mobilize the majority of the world around the climate change issue and create a *binding* agreement. One of the most impressive aspects was its ability to convince the United States to sign onto the treaty in 1998. The U.S accounted for 36% of the global GHG emissions at the time,^{xlviii} so this development was an impressive feat. Although the U.S later decided against ratification, Kyoto still regulated the large majority of the world. The EU’s success has been met with increased international credibility and by “implementing its own marketing emissions the EU may well become the international standard-setter, finding itself in control of the most important regulatory effort to limit greenhouse gases.”^{xlix} The EU’s leadership position cannot be contested and the international community awaits its next move.

Failure of the EU

While the successes of the EU are laudable, there has been one significant failure in international environmental policy leadership amongst the group, which demands attention. This failure stems directly from the EU’s motivation of regulatory politics as its reason to be green. The specific example reviewed here is the lack of forestry protection at the international level.

The area of forestry is one with which the international community has floundered. The absence of any significant international policy surrounding this issue is striking. It is peculiar because, “countries [have] participated in numerous global and regional initiatives to devise international policies for sustainable forest management, but negotiations have consistently failed to produce a forest policy agreement, despite a consensus among governments that the rate of deforestation is unsustainable”¹. It is disappointing how

fruitless forestry negotiation at the international level has been. However, there have been forest-related international events, beginning with the 1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) negotiations.^{li} Here the focus will shift to the two events in forest negotiations that best reveal the EU's regulatory policy motivation as a weakness. The first was proposed after the famed 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, commonly referred to as the "Rio Summit." The initiative began when "parties to the ITTA considered expanding the scope of the treaty to include boreal and temperate forests."^{lii} At this time, the ITTA was the only existing relevant forest agreement. One of the major weaknesses of the ITTA is its narrow scope—it only regulates trade in tropical timber. This was problematic considering that boreal and temperate forests supply 80% of industrial timber on the international market.^{liii} As a result, the ITTA, with monitoring capacity over only 20% of the international industrial timber market, is very weak. Expanding the scope of the ITTA would be practical move, but both the United States and the EU objected this proposal, claiming the change was unacceptable.^{liv} Understandably, the developing world saw this objection as hypocritical as the developed world was "pressing them to take costly action to protect tropical forests but was unwilling to reciprocate with temperate and boreal forests"^{lv} The refusal of the EU to submit to any binding regulation over its own forests reveals that environmental protection was not at the root of this issue.

Following this failure, the EU continued to claim its stance as treaty advocates. It should be noted that the majority of Europe did not have any deforestation issues. Therefore, an "international agreement would entail zero policy costs and, at the same time, reap domestic and international political benefits."^{lvi} Agreeing to a treaty appeared to be a 'win-win' situation: the EU would not incur increased domestic costs, and instead would be pleasing the public and forcing the developing world to be faced with the same market costs. The EU claimed being committed to a treaty, but its actions made it clear that these types of statements may have been more of a "saving face" effort. The EU was not getting involved in forest protection for the sake of forest protection. This was made obvious at the third International Forest Forum meeting with the EU's refusal to incorporate financing forest conservation in the text of agreements.^{lvii} It is important to take note of the EU's reliance on cheap logging exports from the developing world. Additionally, France, Germany, and the UK are included in the list of major importers of forest products.^{lviii} Funding developing countries to increase their forestry standards would be detrimental to the EU economy, as it would raise home production costs and increase expenses to fund other countries. If forestry products became a more expensive import, it would result in EU market distortions. As regulatory politics suggests, economic success transcends environmental protection. For international forest policy, international cooperation would negatively affect the EU economy, and as a result, has become deemed unworthy of policy. The EU may have appeared to be dedicated to forestry protection, but upon a closer look at its actions, it has been proven otherwise. It appears that by acting as though they were deeply involved in forest protection, the EU

As regulatory politics suggests, economic success transcends environmental protection. For international forest policy, international cooperation would negatively affect the EU economy, and as a result, has become deemed unworthy of policy.

supranationalist bodies satisfied the public, but privately worked to preserve their own market. The EU is not ready to fight for forestry until the rest of the world will follow suit. If competition like the U.S is not equally willing to fund developing countries, the expense is far too high for their domestic markets at this point in time.

Conclusion

Through a comprehensive comparison between the success of the EU in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the failure of the EU in regards to the absence of international forest protection policy, the EU's practice of regulatory politics as both a strength and weakness has been revealed. This essay established that the EU's true motivation for creating 'green' policy stems from regulatory political goals, which simultaneously acts as both the greatest weakness and strength of the EU in its effectiveness as a progressive leader in global environmental governance. This motivation stems from the supranational EU actors in an effort to use environmental policy to open doors into other policy sectors, and increase control over member states through further integration. This is made obvious upon the realization that growth in environmental policy has developed in a distinctly federal manner, growing increasingly centralized over the years.^{lix}

It is important to recognize that the EU is undeniably "green," albeit not in an altruistic sense. Although the EU's motivation for creating and implementing green policy may be limiting, and in some circles, not respectable, it has elevated it to a definite status of 'green', and allowed for immense progress in global environmental governance that is beneficial for all. The EU's fierce dedication to environmental protection and sustainable development is remarkable. It remains far beyond the rest of the world in its environmental efforts, embracing its leadership role in global environmental governance. Looking back at history, "the emergence of the EU as a leading player in global environmental politics could hardly have been predicted [but], nonetheless, policies to ensure a high level of environmental protection became one of the fastest growing areas of EU legislation."^{lx} Its prowess in environmental leadership is so well established that when the EU comes to mind, the word "green" is associated with it. It could be reasonably hoped that when the EU effectively reaches its goal of a level playing field in the international market, it will continue on its path to great 'greenness'. The type of innovation and dedication the EU has brought forward concerning global environmental governance will be necessary to ameliorate environmental degradation.

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Goal Structure: A Comparative Analysis of the Japanese Samurai and the Greek Agathos

Michael Filice

Abstract

This paper provides a full comparison of the goal structures of warriors in the Homeric Greek culture and 17th century Japanese culture, and uses these observations to comment on broader social norms. Warriors are referred to as Agathos and Samurai respectively. The Samurai and Agathos are compared by examining the way in which each of the societies structures its goals. Specifically, it is shown that the Greek Agathos existed in a culture that favoured results because, in Greek society, a person was either born a great champion and thus indispensable or a coward and an incompetent warrior. However, the Samurai are shown to have an attempt-based society because an effective Samurai did not have to be born with any innate traits, making it possible to craft a model warrior. This will provide a very different precedent for the way that the Samurai treat battle preparation and the different ways in which they procure friends. Finally the last comparisons of the two warrior cultures will be based on their different methods of perceiving destitution and wealth. Ultimately showing that, to a Samurai, something is only negative if it impeded one's ability to act according to the tenets of the Samurai code, while the Agathos only recognize things as negative if they were obstacles to their goal.

An Introduction to Warrior Cultures

The Samurai of pre-seventeenth century Japan and the Homeric Greek Agathos have always been held as examples of honour, duty, and heroism. This essay intends to compare and contrast the similarities and differences on theories of poverty within the two groups, with evidence taken from *Hagakure* written by Yamamoto Tsunetomo and translated by William Scott Wilson,ⁱ *The Code of the Samurai* written by Taira Shigesuke and translated by Thomas Cleary,ⁱⁱ and Homer's *The Iliad*, translated by Alexander Pope.ⁱⁱⁱ The Japanese texts were published in the 1700s and described the life and philosophy of the Samurai of the

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preceding century—these individuals belonged to one of the first generations of Samurai that did not participate in a single major battle or war. Therefore, much of the author's lives were spent contemplating the most important tenets of the Samurai code, which much later became known as The Way of the Samurai, or Bushido. Homer's *Iliad* is considered by many to be among the greatest works of literature to have ever been produced and portrays excellently the values and principles of the period of Grecian civilization. This essay intends to demonstrate that the most fundamental difference between the Samurai and the Agathos is what will be called attempt-oriented culture and results culture. This theory will show that although many of the conclusions of the Samurai or the Agathos are the same, the reasoning behind these conclusions are fundamentally different. Ultimately, this essay intends to discover the principle differences between the Samurai and the Agathos with an emphasis on the comparison of the Samurai's attempt oriented culture in relation to the Greek's results culture, and how this should be the underlying theme in all discussion of what defines the ideal lifestyle or good life when discussing the two warrior classes.

Before any discussion can be made on either side it is important to highlight recurring motifs that will be discussed. The form of poverty that will be discussed here is poverty described as shameful or dishonourable. Individuals who fall into this group of 'poverty as shame' are those who have lowered the social standing of themselves, their leader, or their subordinates in relation to their culture's goal structure, attempt oriented or results oriented. Therefore, poverty as shame is a much broader concept than the standard understanding of poverty as destitution; however, it may be seen that destitution can contribute to a warrior's shame but may not be intrinsically shameful in itself. The last theme that will be discussed is the Greek understanding of friendship, which must be understood in a different form than the common definition. In Homeric Grecian society, friendship was more akin to what we would understand as battle allies, meaning that these individuals would come provide aid in distressing circumstances.

Next it will be necessary to provide an outline of the societal position of both the Samurai and the Agathos before any analysis on their ideals can be approached. Foremost amongst the differences in their cultures was the idea that individual Samurai served their feudal lord, a group who in Japan were called the Daimyo, while comparatively the Agathos was the leader of the group itself. It must be clearly defined then that the Greek Agathos and the Japanese Samurai will be compared as different warrior groups and not as leaders of their societies because the Samurai was in no way a leader. There will be no discourse on the way that the Samurai operated under the Daimyo because this was left as a gap in the writings of both the authors.^{iv}

It is also important to note the status of currency when discussing theories on poverty in Homeric Greece and 17th century Japan. In Japan in the 1600s, coinage had been established as a method of currency for well over 400 years, and therefore presents a very different economic system from Grecian society in 700 BCE, in which currency was not introduced until a much later time period. Unfortunately however, the Japanese writers make very little discussion on the importance of currency for Samurai culture. The implication to this is that wealth was not a goal pursued by the Samurai, as it was never outlined when discussing their philosophy.

Distinguishing Goal Structures

To effectively analyze the Samurai's attempt oriented culture in relation to the Greek results culture, it will be necessary to discuss from what underlying principle these cultures originate. This principle could best be described as contrasting views on how a bravery. The Samurai believed that it was possible to develop bravery. This is very unlike the Greek view that bravery was a trait inherit at birth and therefore impossible to obtain if not already part of one's nature. The Samurai view is perfectly explained by Taira Shigesuke. She states that

there are those who are hesitant in danger, their hearts pounding, their knees trembling, yet they go ahead, realizing that if their comrades see if they alone do not go, determined not to expose themselves to ridicule later on. Although they are far inferior to the naturally brave ones, when they have gone through this time and time again, fighting in battle after battle, eventually their minds settle and they become praiseworthy knights, they become strong and firm, not so different from those who are naturally brave.^v

This idea that any Samurai can become brave is extremely important because it implies that any individual with the proper experience and training can be made into a good Samurai.^{vi} In contrast, the Greek Agathos' in *The Iliad* were so unique and special that Homer repeatedly states that many were fostered by or were the children of the gods. A perfect example of this is the fact that Achilles, who is perhaps the model for the ideal Agathos, is the child of Thetis, a minor goddess of the sea.^{vii} This implies that an individual must necessarily be born of a noble lineage to be an effective leader. This is effectively the most important contrast between the two warrior groups. Ultimately, portraying the idea that any Samurai born within their caste level would be sufficient in their duties whereas an Agathos must be a part of the nobility to be competent. Thus, it will be understood that anything that contributes to either of the cultures' goal structures will necessarily be attempt-based or results-based.

The idea that all Samurai were born equal in comparison to the Agathos' ideal of necessary nobility is important in the initial discussion of attempt culture versus results culture. It can be understood then, by comparison, a Samurai is much less important than the Agathos to society because if one were to fall in battle, a new Samurai of roughly equal usefulness could be created. However, an excellent Agathos would be much more difficult to replace because an Agathos must be of a noble bloodline in order to display any heroic attributes. Both these ideas lend to the way that goals are oriented in their culture. In Japanese attempt culture, immediacy in action to achieve a goal was more favoured than planning and attaining said goal. This means it was cowardly and shameful to plan and ensure success than to act immediately and die before achieving said goal. It then could be said that attempting to attain a goal is part of the goal itself. Yamamoto Tsunetomo even states that "the way of the Samurai is one of immediacy,"^{viii} and therefore "to die without achieving one's goal is a dog's death and fanaticism. But there is no shame in this."^{ix} The most important thing, then, in the ideal Japanese lifestyle, is the attempting to achieve a goal and not in the achieving of the goal itself. Obviously this can only occur because all Samurai are seen to be of roughly equal worth and thus dispensable, as new Samurai could

fill the gaps as they were needed. The idea of the Samurai's dispensability provides the basis for the attempt oriented culture of 17th century Japan.

The Agathos is very different because they are much more difficult to replace. This is the basis for the emphasis on results in Greek culture, an idea reinforced in the *Iliad*, which observed the Greeks retreating from battle when they found it unnecessary, and regrouping strategically for a later attack, when success was more likely. Perhaps the clearest example of this is Ajax, who defended a Grecian retreat against the Trojans, with the hope that the Greeks would regroup behind Achilles to refresh their attack. It reads, "Thus on retreating Greece the Trojans pour; wave their thick falchions, and their javelins shower: But Ajax turning to their fears they yield, all pale they tremble and forsake the field."^x Clearly this shows that at some level it is more important to be able to escape a battle if there is a clear intention to return and fight later with higher chances of success. Ajax was thus able to protect his Oikos in retreat in hopes that, Achilles, a more accomplished Agathos, would be able revitalise the charge against the Trojans and restore Greek morale. The results of the Grecian retreat made evident that they were able to recuperate behind a much more powerful leader adding any chances to success. This serves to prove the idea that in Greek culture, there was a much larger emphasis on the success of the goal than in its attempt, which reinforces the idea of a results oriented culture for the ideal life of the Agathos in contrast to that of the Samurai.

It can be understood then that both cultures would be more willing to die than to live with poverty as shame. However, the Japanese's attempt oriented culture is much more extreme in their idea of shame, believing that acting without immediacy is shameful, and that it is better to die because one acted without preparation than to guarantee success through waiting. For the Agathos, shame comes from failing to achieve a goal. This lends to the point that the way goals are oriented changes the definition of shame in a society. This directly translates to the idea that the ideal lifestyle for the Samurai consisted of a much more fanatical basis when making decisions in comparison to that of the Agathos.

Application of the Model

Due to the establishment of an understanding of how the Samurai attempt oriented culture functions very differently than Greek results oriented culture, one can define a model for predicting how each warrior group would function in different scenarios. Predictions will be made on how the Samurai culture and the Agathos will function in their preparation for battle in a peace time scenario,^{xi} and to close there will be discourse on how the different cultures react to destitution.

Application One: Battle Preparations

Battle preparation in peace time is something that is necessarily important for all warrior groups as it provides the opportunity to formulate precautionary plans that lay the ground work for any future conflicts. This manifests very differently among the Samurai and the Agathos; the reasoning for this can be found individually outlined in the variances of attempt culture versus results culture. The Samurai did not believe in formal battle preparations; instead, mentally evaluating all possibilities was the only way to prepare for upcoming situations. This was because "when the time comes [to make decisions], there is

no moment for reasoning. And if you have not done your inquiry beforehand, there is most often shame.”^{xii} This statement emphasizes the point that the Samurai did not rely on anything other than mental preparedness when readying for battle in peace time. This is a perfect manifestation of an attempt culture’s thought process, as it describes the emphasis in acting immediately and following that initial decision until you are met with success or else failure.

The Agathos were much different in their approach to battle preparation as the Greeks believed it was necessary to procure friends to help achieve their goals. Friends were made through gift giving, with the gift acting as the symbol of the bond. Nowhere can the idea of a ritual alliance be demonstrated better than in the case of Tydide and Glaucus, individual Agathos, fighting for opposite sides of the Trojan War. Upon meeting during combat, instead of attacking one another, they embraced upon the battlefield:

In earth the generous warrior fix’d his dart, Then friendly, thus the Lycian prince address’d: ‘Welcome, my brave hereditary guest! Thus ever let us meet, with kind embrace, Nor stain the sacred friendship of our race. Know, chief, our grandsires have been guests of old; Oeneus the Strong, Bellerophon the bold: Our ancient seat his honour’d presence graced, Where twenty days in genial rites he pass’d. The parting heroes mutual presents left.’^{xiii}

Here it is evident that ritual alliances based on gift giving were an important part of an Agathos’ duty. Indeed, it could even be said that they were even more important than the war itself, as Tydides and Glaucus ignored the fighting that was going on around them to discuss their old alliance. Due to the results oriented nature of the Agathos it could therefore be argued that their reason for acting in this manner is as follows: if they did not embrace and show recognition of their alliance they would be perceived as acting shamefully. This was due to the idea that in a results oriented culture, acting as a bad ally would become a hindrance later, as it would be an impediment in achieving future goals since friends would reciprocate bad behaviour. This ultimately shows that the Agathos believed in procuring insurance through gift giving, and alliances were an important method of preparation for battle in peace time. This notion directly contrasts the Samurai’s belief that the individual only needs to mentally prepare for unexpected situations to be able to suitably handle them.

Application Two: Perception of Destitution

The next theme that will be analyzed is how the two groups handle destitution, why they both perceive destitution as negative, and why the Samurai believed destitution may cause shame, while the Agathos believed that being destitute necessarily constituted shame.

The Samurai believed that destitution may be an indirect cause of shame because it may hinder one’s ability to act with immediacy. This was never clearer than in the writings of Taira Shigesuke who believed that, if during a period of hardship you were

given special duties and therefore have emergency expenses [that you cannot pay] you should meet the expenses yourself ... even if you have to pawn your spare sword and your wife’s jewelry box. This is taking care to prevent others from talking, because ... the senior officials of the

establishment may look down on you, thinking you are becoming importunate in a manner unbecoming of a knight.^{xiv}

It can therefore be understood that to a Samurai, destitution was not inherently bad as long as an individual could keep it hidden and could attend to his duties with immediacy. It could be said then that the opposite would be true as well that if destitution became a hindrance to accomplishing (or attempting) one's duty it would then be considered shameful.

To the Greek Agathos, however, the shamefulness of destitution evolved from the results oriented culture that dominated their lives. Although the opinion that destitution begs shame is never expressly stated, it can be seen when examining its results oriented culture. Results oriented cultures are based on the founding principle that the Agathos was meant to achieve goals to procure honor for himself and the Oikos. The easiest way to do this was to procure friends and allies, which ultimately required being able to dole out gifts as symbols of the bond of friendship. In order to do this however, one needed to be wealthy—to be an Agathos, then, necessitated wealth. It follows that to be poor would directly hinder the process of acquiring friends, contributing to the shamefulness of destitution prevalent in the Agathos' results oriented culture.

Conclusions and Future Research Opportunities

This essay examined the goal structure of two of the world's most famous warrior groups: the Japanese Samurai and the Greek Agathos. It was shown that because Samurai were thought to be created from zero, and thus replaceable, they were noted as being attempt oriented. The Agathos, however, were different because they were a noble class and were less expendable, and were therefore more results oriented. How each culture viewed success deeply affected the way they prepared for battle, and their views on destitution. For example the Samurai viewed meditation as the primary means for to prepare for battle, since reacting to different situations with immediacy was more important for than long term gains. The Agathos viewed battle preparation in an entirely different context, because of their results oriented culture the Agathos deemed accumulating friendships and alliances necessary to come out victorious. The Agathos made friends and alliances because it was understood that friends would be available to help one another achieve goals. Destitution was also viewed very differently in each culture, with the Samurai understanding it as something that has the potential to cause shame, as it may impede the ability to react with immediacy but, did not explicitly cause shame itself. The Agathos, however, perceived destitution as utterly shameful in itself because it was impossible to gather friends or act as a good friend if one did not have the money to provide a gift to solidify your bonds.

Ultimately, this essay hoped to provide a basic understanding of these two cultures and to accurately depict how poverty was conducive to shame. To further expand on the body of research, an examination of the effect of religion could make for a much deeper analysis.

Endnotes

- i. Tsunetomo Yamamoto and William S. Wilson, *Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai* (Tokyo: Shambalha Publications, 1979).
- ii Taira Shigesuke and Thomas F. Cleary. *Code of the Samurai: A Modern Translation of the Bushidō shoshinshū* (Rutland: Tuttle Publising, 1999).
- iii Alexander Pope, "The Illiad Of Homer." Ed. T.H. Buckley (London: Frederick Warne, 1896).
- iv. It seems that how Samurai operated under the Daimyo was left out of the literature because both authors believed that these ideas were self-evident and thus, not necessary to explain to future generations.
- v. Shigesuke and Cleary, *Code of the Samurai*, 19-20.
- vi. As an aside it is also important to note that ultimately the Samurai were not the leaders of their perspective culture which lends to the idea that they were not as individually important as their Greek counterparts who also had to look out for their Oikos.
- vii. Pope, *The Iliad of Homer*, 14.
- viii. Yamamoto and Wilson, *Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai*, 47.
- ix. *Ibid.*, 1.
- x. Pope, *The Iliad of Homer*, 329.
- xi. Functionally, this is a discussion of the way both groups procure insurance; however, it will be shown that because the Samurai do not do actually do anything of the sort, the term insurance was not used.
- xii. Yamamoto and Wilson, *Hagakure: The Book of the Samurai*, 16.
- xiii. Pope, *The Iliad of Homer*, 115.
- xiv. Shigesuke and Cleary, *Code of the Samurai*, 66.

The United States' Military-Industrial Complex: Results of Unwarranted Influence

Benjamin Charlebois

Abstract

First described by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Military-Industrial Complex represents the unwarranted influence of elite groups that continually justify higher amounts of military spending. Since World War 2, the United States has unceasingly wasted taxpayer dollars on needless research and development, recruitment, and basic products, even during times of economic turmoil. The complex relationship between the defence industry, lawmakers and defence contractors has led to structural miss-organization that makes any attempt at reform politically consequential. Indeed, unless action is taken to curb the impact of lobbying groups that have entrenched the Military-Industrial Complex, the United States will continue to put the needs of the defence industry ahead of the general public.

Introduction

In 1961, United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned the nation that the creation of a permanent armaments industry following WWII had created a latent and subversive problem. The long-term increases in defence spending that were first used for legitimate national security interests after WWII had begun to serve only the interests of an elite group that used the projection of power as a way to justify the continued expansion of military spending.¹ This entrenched expansion of the U.S. military is referred to as the military-industrial complex (MIC)—the impact of unchecked industry influence on issues of defence spending. This essay argues the MIC undermines democratic legitimacy when significant political and financial capital is used to lobby the U.S. defence system.

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This paper first suggests that taxpayer dollars are being misspent on unnecessary arms procurement and development due to the extent of corruption that exists within military contracting. Next, the paper provides background information alluding to why the defence industry gained political clout following WWII. It will then examine contrasting economic principles inherent to the defence industry. The paper will provide an example of the conflicting interests of those who make decisions related to the MIC and allow it to retain influence in the defence sector despite the waste and impracticalities pointed out previously. Finally, solutions to curb the influence of the MIC will be examined.

Before discussing a large and often misunderstood topic, an overview of the nature of the MIC is required. This paper does not examine whether the MIC exists to perpetuate an endless series of military engagements. The connection between the presence of an able military and the likelihood of its utilization by a given administration requires different analysis. Rather, this paper assesses whether the MIC leads to a manipulation of government contracts, regardless of whether the results of these contracts ever appear on foreign soils. It is not the very idea of aggressive contract-seeking which negatively serves US interests, but the manner with which it is done. As Eisenhower prophesied in 1961, the “acquisition of unwarranted influence” on behalf of the military sector is a threat to the sovereignty of the American people.ⁱⁱ

Unwarranted Influence

The presence of “unwarranted influence” will first be examined. Consider a recent example, from October 2012, when the U.S. Army Chief of Staff presented Congress an opportunity to save U.S. \$3-billion by putting a three-year hold on tank production.ⁱⁱⁱ At the time, more than 2,000 M1 Abrams tanks sat unused in a California field, prompting the Chief of Staff to state the tank fleet was in good shape and could afford to wait a few years until newer technology was available.^{iv} One defence analyst argued that when an agency as opposed to risk-taking as the US Army says that it has had enough, politicians should take that at face value.^v But, Congress voted against the measure, suggesting interrupting tank production would damage the supply chain and reduce the number of skilled workers necessary for future construction. Others cited, with great concern, the lost jobs associated with the removal of planned military spending.^{vi} In a similar fashion, the Department of Defence (DoD) continues to purchase the military cargo plan C-27J, despite the fact that a number of operational C-27Js have been called redundant and taken out of service in the last few years. Nearly half a billion has been spent on these planes since 2007, with the last shipment going directly from the factory into storage.^{vii} Pleas from the manufacturer and the Member of Congress representing the district in which these planes were constructed allowed the unnecessary spending to proceed. Unfortunately, these examples are abundant within the U.S. military budget. Armaments development is one of the industry’s most wasteful elements. Forbes estimates that since the end of the Cold War, the US has spent close to \$100-billion in development of weapons or vehicles that never made it into production.^{viii} Given this number, it’s no surprise that weapons procurement and development is one of the most inefficient aspects of the defence industry.

Although the DOD may be wasteful, it is the largest employer in the world.^{ix} Thus, the costs of doing business should, correspondingly, be lower due to effective economies of scale and the power of buying in bulk. Instead, the DOD uses 'Prime Vendor Programs' that utilize third party suppliers to reduce warehouse costs.^x Yet, this program has resulted in continued wasteful spending, such as the paying of \$20 for ice cube trays that retail for a less than a dollar, and the buying of kitchen supplies at costs of two and a half times greater than what other government agencies spend.^{xi} Meanwhile, large-scale corruption has been found within the DOD. It is estimated that between \$10-18 billion was lost to fraud from civil contingency contracts in Afghanistan during the American occupation alone.^{xii}

The excessive spending levels of the DOD are especially significant today. The large national debt dominates political discourse in addition to the deficit, which is still over 4% of GDP, nearly \$700 billion.^{xiii} Frugality is needed within the defence budget, where billions of dollars in waste are funded and juxtaposed against cuts to popular programs like social welfare.^{xiv}

Unfortunately, the misuse of federal budget money stems from the structural organization of the defence industry. The relationship between the defence industry, the military and politicians responsible for authorizing and appropriating funding exists today as Eisenhower described it. Indeed, manipulation and deceit by third parties to ensure enormous budgets are given to the defence sector, in order to ensure their interests are given 'unwarranted attention,' are very much intrinsic to the organization of the industry. Following WWII, defence spending was used to bolster the economy and contributed to the enormous economic gains seen after WWII, which enabled the U.S. to vault from a depression to a world superpower.^{xv} Today, the defence industry is so firmly embedded within the economy that policy makers make exceptions to conventional economic doctrines to fund defence. Consider the banking and automotive sectors, which both benefited from government intervention during the great recession. Those industries did not receive money from Congress until they were on the verge of significant collapses that threatened the national economy. During this time, U.S. legislators continued to give an inordinate amount of attention to the defence industry, perhaps due to the near \$150-million that was spent by lobbyists on behalf of the defence industry,^{xvi} with \$27-million being given directly to politicians.^{xvii} In one instance, a Congressman appropriated a large, but unwanted, order of Humvee vehicles and was rewarded with \$80,000 in personal contributions from Humvee manufacturers.^{xviii} This reciprocal relationship extends past the political realm into the military itself, with what is known as the 'revolving door' effect.

The revolving door effect refers to military personnel that are courted by defence contractors to the private sector to be used as lobbyists with insider knowledge of the military. This concept is entrenched through the "up-or-out" policy, which forces military personnel to resign if they do not reach specific career objectives within a given timeframe.^{xix} Notably, this policy applies to all positions in the military—even at the executive level. Inevitably, this policy forces out those who may not be ready to retire, particularly if they still have large amounts of debt. Moreover, military personnel often exaggerate the costs of defence contracts towards the end of their careers, in order to look favourable to the defence contractors that hire them. Many return to lobby from the other side, using their military experience to validate and impress their claims to politicians on

behalf of the contractors. The presence of military-turned-private-sector lobbyists reminds personnel of what they can attain personally if they leave the military. In these ways, a very obvious conflict of interest is generated between the private contractors and those who vouch for their services.

In 2009, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates vowed to make drastic changes to military contracting regulation, but was replaced before disclosing his plans.^{xx} The prevalence of “political engineering”—the manner in which defence subcontracts are “parcelled” out to the districts of politically powerful members of Congress—was the subject of debate, and ideally Gates’ proposals would have curbed this aspect of the MIC.^{xxi} Additionally, in 2008 a largely Democratic Congress passed legislation requiring military employees of a certain rank to obtain the opinion of an ethics committee before accepting compensation from private contractors; however, these opinions are not binding.^{xxii} Predictably, Defence officials ardently oppose this type of legislation and use the ethics committee sparsely.^{xxiii}

Defence Spending and Economic Stimulation

A common justification for extremely large defence budgets shows high amounts of military spending stimulate the economy.^{xxiv} However, though military spending was important following WWII and during the Cold War, it does not create rampant growth in peacetime. Kennedy theorizes that nations who spend a greater proportion of their GDP on military eventually slow their economic growth relative to nations who invest more in commercial competition and civilian markets.^{xxv} This trend, carried over an extended period of time, may temporarily increase the perceived security of a nation at its particular position in the global hierarchy, but in reality, weakens its security for the future.^{xxvi} Kennedy points out that while military and economic strength are critical to maintaining power, they are not important in absolute terms, but in relative terms.^{xxvii} A nation that is growing economically—but not as fast as its rivals—will inevitably fall behind.

Political aversion to cutting military spending permeates both parties.^{xxviii} Many Democrats and Republicans receive millions of dollars of defence industry lobbying and campaign donations, as the problems associated with lobbying are less to do with partisan interests, as they are structural problems.^{xxix} This is evident by the American’s favouritism towards defence spending instead of education or health care. Substantial increases in defence spending were inversely proportional to the public’s reactive perception of defence spending; particularly when that increase was not accompanied by proportional increases to non-defence spending.^{xxx} One of the factors, which alleviate this disapproval, is the presence of an external threat, which is seen to combat the relationship of inverse proportionality between spending increases and public approval for defence spending.^{xxxi}

Following the invasion of Iraq, U.S. nationalism skyrocketed, as compared to shortly after the terrorist attacks of 2001.^{xxxii} The propagated correlation between American patriotism and support for the American military has implications for American foreign policy, but also the MIC. President George W. Bush stated in 2002 that there is no “American race”, but there is an “American creed.”^{xxxiii} This quote may seem abstract, but it exemplifies that American nationalism is value-based, almost to the point of dogma.

Revealed in this quote is the suggestion that disconnecting the idea of American military dominance from the American nationalism may prove one of the greater obstacles in overcoming the complex system that so easily manipulates those values. It will undoubtedly take significant political capital to undo the grip the military industrial complex has upon appropriations budgets and a public, which identifies enthusiastically with the culture of military excess. Several interest groups have fought in favour of institutional resistance, citing American exceptionalism or superpower status, as narratives to explain the importance of the historic roles played by the U.S. Armed Forces. Further, the DOD spends close to \$2-billion per year on marketing and recruitment.^{xxxiv} With figures as high as those, the MIC's strong grasp on American society is better understood. This "unchecked influence" permeates not America's political realm, but the social realm.

The entrenched waste and inefficiency caused by the MIC is difficult to remove. Many members of both parties would likely oppose legislating any corrective measures in Congress. That the MIC has manipulated relationships between the government and private contractors and the relationship between lawmakers and their duty to the public creates a challenging task for society. As well, considering the U.S. military has been tied to patriotism and identity for over half a century, a monumental political shift would be required to even begin addressing this concern.

The MIC has permeated the U.S., additionally, by creating jobs.^{xxxv} For example, the F-22 program employs contractors and subcontractors in 44 states, which encourages Congressional Democrats to support the program even if Obama criticizes it.^{xxxvi} The defence industry possesses significant political capital, which jeopardizes Congress's will to reduce spending or increase accountability. However, one example of an action taken that acknowledges the costly effects of the MIC is the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA).^{xxxvii} It creates new positions of oversight within the DOD, with regards to weapons system development, and goes as far as recommending that the department rewrite its policy with regards to organizational conflicts of interest in weapons procurement.^{xxxviii} The Act notably lacks enforcement capabilities, and relies on bureaucracy within the DOD to generate responsible procurement procedures. Former Undersecretary of Defence Ashton Carter believed the DOD could increase their war fighting capabilities by 2-3% without proportionally increased spending, simply by eliminating waste and said that the Pentagon needed to be more "respectful of the American taxpayer" by fostering legitimate competition amongst its subcontractors.^{xxxix} While it is clear that Pentagon officials are upset with seemingly arbitrary cuts to defence spending, it appears to have encouraged them to cut costs with greater urgency.^{xl} The War Profiteering Prevention Act (WPPA) was another recent attempt to legislate reform in the defence sector. Having been introduced into the Senate three times in the past 11 years (the last attempt occurring in 2007), the WPPA would hold military contractors accountable for the exorbitant losses in Afghanistan and Iraq.^{xli}

Solutions

Admittedly, there is no clear solution to mitigate the excess propagated by the MIC. Solutions to curb the influence of the defence industry consist of the following: First,

sequestration of the military would require the DOD to institute and follow spending caps, which would force the military to address their own inadequacies. Second, if requiring documentation of moves between the private and public sectors of defence has not limited their occurrence, stricter mandates may be necessary to reform the revolving door effect. Solving this problem requires one of two approaches: either the government finds a way to discourage the transition from the military to the private sector, or they make it impractical for the private sector to attempt such practices. This could be done by altering the previously discussed “Up-or-Out” policy in such a way that would reduce the high rate of officer turnover. Third, there is a need to enforce tangible repercussions upon contractors who are found to have misled or misappropriated funds received from the DOD. Perhaps steps should be taken to penalize cost overrun, rather than incentivizing cost-control. In 2008, for instance, 70% of the Pentagon’s most substantial contracts were over budget, amounting to nearly \$300 billion in excess spending.^{xliii} The unwillingness of the DoD to defend their own interests as customers, as well as the weakness of the contracts they enter into has led to the seemingly inevitable cost ‘creep’ that the Undersecretary referred to in his memorandum referenced earlier.^{xliiii}

The Department of Defence occasionally appropriates weapons systems under the terms of a contract referred to in the sector as “cost plus,” where the plus is intended to denote a percentage or flat rate fee on top of reimbursement for the contractor’s expenses.^{xliv} However, billions of dollars are wasted on cost-plus weapons systems like F-35 planes.^{xlv} If these contracts cannot be appropriately capped, the DOD needs to determine a more fiscally responsible way to pay their contractors. Any reform, which takes place with regards to defence contracts, needs to recognize the needs and rights of the customer (the DOD), particularly in light of the huge profits available to the contracted. Although subcontracting is thought to be cost-effective, the market of contractors is not competitive. According to Cato, only 40% of defence contracts were genuinely competitive between 1999 and 2003 (meaning multiple bidders).^{xlvi} The DOD would benefit from going to greater lengths to ensure genuine competition.

Reducing the political benefits of appropriating defence spending would ameliorate the persisting problem of politicians whom are reluctant to cut military spending that will impact their district. It becomes necessary, in this case, for the federal government to make these instances less politically advantageous. One solution would allow the DOD to formally designate unwanted or unnecessary appropriations, and communicate this designation to Congress in such a manner that a portion of the costs cease to be the responsibility of the federal government. Implementation of this designation would require Congress to cease funding for a portion of the contract, which would be taken by the state instead.

The US armed forces spend superfluously in order to not only meet recruitment goals, but to generate a positive brand image to the American people. In 2007 alone, the total recruiting budget was \$3.2-billion across the four main branches of the armed forces.^{xlvii} Many marketing campaigns use manipulative imagery, suggesting that a man’s potential is dependent on his enlisting in the Armed Forces. Consider Operation Earnest Voice, contracted out to a California technology firm in 2011 with the intention of allowing the military to disseminate pro-American sentiment through a number of fake social media profiles, each with its own convincing background.^{xlviii} The military’s marketing campaigns

link positive public opinion to the likelihood of the public's acceptance of the military's ever-increasing budget requirements. Thus, limiting the influence of a government agency that uses public funding to convince the public of its need for funding appears to be important. Constraints should be levied not only on the military's advertising budget, but the venues and mediums with which it is allowed to advertise. For example, when they perform low-altitude fly-bys at sports events, the cost is not just the figures associated with operating the fighter jets,^{xlix} but the association of expensive, loud, impressive military technology with the excitement and spirit of sports. If the military were limited in the ways they were allowed to portray their weapons of war, or those who use them, it would disassociate the military from civilian culture and for many, it would likely contribute to a psychological transition with regards to what it means to be American.

In summary, there exist a number of options that may be explored to reduce the inefficiencies inherent to the MIC. It is likely that sequestration of the military directly would be highly unpopular in both parties. Even the Obama administration, which had been adamant that defence spending needed to be cut, has recently called for a halt to any military budget cuts.¹ Nevertheless, the recent success of austerity measures and the exposing of associated overly dramatic rhetoric as essentially invalid makes this a viable option, and one that may be repeated in the future. Solving the problem of the revolving door presents many challenges, as conflict-of-interest rules are incredibly difficult to enforce. For this reason, targeting the revolving door on its own is not likely to have a substantial effect barring any (likely unconstitutional) laws prohibiting particular employment decisions, but removing or changing policies such as Up-or-Out would limit the prevalence of this particular phenomenon.

It is understandably difficult to remove the prevalence of contractor influence from the military it contracts for. But criminalizing corruption in defence contracting would allow the beneficiaries of DOD funds to be held accountable for their actions. Reforming the contracting procedures and stipulations given to defence contractors would diminish the need for such an act by limiting the acceptability of waste in the first place. With such large contracts at stake, surely contractors could find a way to mitigate risk and still post a healthy profit. This particular option is not very specific, as the intricacies of contract law (particularly within the U.S. government) were not explored in this paper. An argument could be made that given the lack of competition in military contracting; advantageous circumstances have already been given to defence contractors, which more than compensate for their 'risk'. While this paper would not recommend anything as radical as total de-privatization of military contracts, the need for real competition cannot be understated. In cases where competition cannot be found, DOD officials should examine the possibility of government-based development and further subcontracting, similar to the way in which NASA operates, as opposed to complete monopolization by the sole bidder.

Limits to the presence of the armed forces in public life and advertisements would help contain the influence of the MIC, as well as generate more informed voters. Any legislative attempt to limit exposure to the American military would be met with harsh criticism from both sides due to the cultural phenomena mentioned above. At this point, the American military is already ubiquitously entrenched within society. An attempt to limit its influence could be made under the premise of reducing unnecessary spending and

limiting the impact of what is essentially federal government propaganda. Two immediate options for implementation stand out. First, legislation could limit the ability of the military to appear in settings, which were neither operationally relevant nor related to the military itself; for instance, football game fly-overs. The second option would be to limit the ability of the military to advertise itself to children by prohibiting them from targeting children's television programs and reducing the appearance of military recruiters at public festivals and schools. The effect on military spending from this policy option would be long-term, as cultural shifts could not be expected to occur quickly. This policy initiative could be identified with family values and protection against the manipulating influence of large government and under such a campaign would have the possibility of generating support from constituents of both parties. While reducing the cultural strength of the MIC does not have immediate benefits aside from cost-cutting, it helps to ensure that in the future, reform will be easier to come by if needed.

Overall, independent of any other actions taken, the military culture within the United States needs to be addressed. The influence of the MIC within the U.S. infiltrates both the public and private realm and allow for greater change to be accomplished. Such changes which should be sought include reforming the contracting of appropriation within the DOD and improving competition, eliminating the political incentives of wasteful spending, and increasing accountability in spending by penalizing fraud, corruption and inefficiency.

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